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2020 ]   COMMR. OF C. EX. & SERVICE TAX, JAMMU & KASHMIR v. GRAVITA METALS   177
               “and”. As clarified by the Board itself in 2006, such a requirement is not neces-
               sary in the definition of manufacture as the same does not have any requirement
               of cumulative satisfaction of conditions. That during the course of hearing, refer-
               ence was also made to the recent Hon’ble Apex Court judgment in the case of
               Servo-Med Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Mumbai - 2015 (319) E.L.T. 578 (S.C.). In this
               decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court was concerned whether sterilisation of syring-
               es and needles amounts to manufacture. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid
               down for clarity various  principles. One of the tests laid  down endorsing the
               judgment in the case of Brakes India Limited (supra), was that of “test of no commer-
               cial use without the process”. It was further explained that, when a different fin-
               ished product comes into existence as a result of a process which makes the said
               product commercially usable, the same leads to manufacture. It has been held
               that there would be manufacture as in the Brakes India Limited (supra) case where
               after the particular process they achieve a new use. That also in cases where the
               goods are transformed into goods which are different or new after a particular
               process, manufacture of goods can be said to have taken place. Thus, applying
               either the analogy of Brakes India case or the test of new or different goods after a
               particular process, or the activity of M/s. GM of making refined lead ingots and
               lead alloy ingots, amounts to manufacture. He submits that, in fact the process of
               sterilisation whereby on the surface of the syringes etc., bacteria had to be re-
               moved was held not to be a process of manufacture in the Servo-Med case. The
               Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that in such a case, each time the syringes were
               sterilised there will be fresh manufacture, which made the proposition absurd.
               The facts of the M/s. GM are more akin to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
               Court in the case of Mamta Surgical (supra) where sterilisation of cotton for mak-
               ing surgical cotton has been held to be a process of manufacture. Similarly, mak-
               ing refined lead and lead alloys to exact specifications for battery manufacture
               definitely amounts to manufacture. Ld.  Counsel submits that in view of the
               above detailed explanation and reasons,  the order  of the Ld. Commissioner is
               incorrect, unjust, arbitrary to treat the process as not amounting to manufacture
               whereas in the case of the appellants’ factory at Gandhidham in Gujarat, duty is
               being collected right from 2004 onwards and even continues today on the same
               activities, apart from number of other units all over India who are paying excise
               duty on the same activities. He submits that the registration certificate has been
               granted to M/s. GM, treating them as manufacturers and this position has not
               undergone any change at the hands of the Department. It is further submitted
               that the Notification No. 56/2002-C.E. itself lays down a procedure as per para-
               graph 2C(e) thereof wherein, if the self-credit taken is wrong then within 15 days
               of the next month, the jurisdictional officer has to direct the reversal of the credit.
               In case the assessee fails to do so then the same becomes recoverable as errone-
               ous refund. The provisions of clause 2C(e) are mandatory since ‘shall’ has been
               used  and thereafter, such an erroneous refund can  be recovered under clause
               2C(g). Therefore, once it is established that there is an erroneous refund after the
               determination, within 15 days of the succeeding  month, as laid down  under
               clause 2C(e), then and then only a show cause notice under Section 11A can be
               issued. In the present case, the Commissioner himself records that no such pro-
               ceedings have taken place in regard to the original  credit taken  and the same
               have become final. Consequently, since the claims for credits have become final,
               there is no question of any erroneous refund which can be recovered under Sec-
               tion 11A. To support his contention he relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex
               Court in the case of  R.C. Tobacco Private Limited v. UOI - 2005 (188) E.L.T. 129
               (S.C.) wherein it has been categorically held that refunds made under the notifi-
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