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244                         EXCISE LAW TIMES                    [ Vol. 372

                                            law permits, to evict a tenant, regardless of his motives. This is unfettered
                                            discretion. But a public authority may do none of these things unless it acts
                                            reasonably and in good faith and upon lawful and relevant grounds of pub-
                                            lic interest. The whole conception of unfettered discretion is inappropriate
                                            to a public authority, which possesses powers solely in order that it may
                                            use them for the public good.
                                            There is nothing paradoxical in the imposition of such legal limits. It would
                                            indeed be paradoxical if they were not imposed.”
                                            30.  In Indian Nut Products and others v. Union of India and others, (1994) 4
                                     SCC 269, while dealing with the similar provision, N.P. Singh J. has opined as
                                     under :-
                                            “10.  It  is well-settled that if a statute requires an authority to exercise
                                            power, when such authority is satisfied that conditions exist for exercise of
                                            that power, the satisfaction  has to  be based on the existence of grounds
                                            mentioned in the statute. The grounds must be made out on the basis of the
                                            relevant material. If the existence of the conditions required for the exercise
                                            of the power is challenged, the courts are entitled to examine whether those
                                            conditions existed when the order was made. A person aggrieved by such
                                            action can question the satisfaction by showing that it was wholly based on
                                            irrelevant grounds and hence amounted to no satisfaction at all. In other
                                            words, the existence of the circumstances in question is open to judicial re-
                                            view.”
                                            31.  The reason to believe as held in Sheo Nath Singh v. CIT, (1972) 3 SCC
                                     234, cannot be basis on mere suspicion, gossip or rumour though belief on an
                                     honest basis and on reasonable grounds and the officer may act on direct or cir-
                                     cumstantial evidence. However, if the officer were to act without any material or
                                     irrelevant, extraneous material, it would constitute an act without jurisdiction.
                                            32.  Sabayasachi Mukharji J., in Indru Ramchand Bharvani & Ors. v. Union
                                     of India & Ors. (1988) 4 SCC 1 = 1992 (59) E.L.T. 201 (S.C.), has clarified that “the
                                     expression ‘reasonable belief’ has to be adjudged from the perspective of a per-
                                     son having an experienced eye”, well equipped to interpret the suspicious cir-
                                     cumstances and to form ‘reasonable belief’.
                                            33.  Kuldip Singh J., in M/s. J.K. Bardolia Mills v. M.L. Khunger, Dy. Col-
                                     lector and others, (1994) 5 SCC 332 = 1994 (72) E.L.T. 813 (S.C.) has held failure on
                                     the part of the authorities to issue show cause notice obliges the authorities to
                                     return the goods without continuance of adjudicatory proceedings in respect
                                     thereof.
                                            34.  We are proceeding to quash the seizure notice and not relegating
                                     the petitioners to an adjudicatory proceedings, and we are also fortified to form
                                     such an opinion, in view of the earlier decision rendered by this Court for Co-
                                     ordinate Bench in Bawa Gopal Das Bedi & Sons and others v. Union of India and oth-
                                     ers, AIR 1982 Patna 152 = 1982 (10) E.L.T. 351 (Pat.) wherein under similar cir-
                                     cumstances, in a writ jurisdiction, the Court quashed similar proceedings rather
                                     than making the party undergo the adjudicatory process for the proceedings ini-
                                     tiated without any basis.
                                            35.  Referring again to the instant case, we notice that the goods as per
                                     invoice  (pages 24-26) originated  from the  State of Assam  on 4th  of February,
                                     2019. They were to be transported to the State of Karnataka. Both the places are
                                     in India not in any specified/notified area under the Act but are the National
                                     Highways in the State of Bihar. On  6th of February,  2019, Inspector/S.O.,
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