Page 234 - ELT_15th May 2020_VOL 372_Part 4th

624 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 372

7. “to restore to a good or sound 7. condition after decay or damage;
mend”
(THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, USA)
8. “to restore to a sound or 8. healthy state”
7. Reconditioning also is more or less synonymous with the word ‘re-
pair’. To ascertain what amounts to manufacture under the Central Excise Act,
1944, we refer to the definitions in Section 2 of the Act. Clause (f), sub-clause (iii)
of this section specifically says that packing or reconditioning of any goods or
even re-labelling of containers amounts to manufacture in respect of goods cov-
ered in Third Schedule to Central Excise Tariff Act. Pharmaceutical products are
covered at Sl. No. 31 of the Third Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act. Since
the product in question is a pharmaceutical product, we also looked into the
chapter notes to Chapter 30 of Central Excise Tariff under which these products
fall. Chapter Note 6 clarifies that while dealing the pharmaceutical products, re-
labelling or re-labelling of the containers intended for consumers or repacking
sought from bulk packs to retail boxes or for adopting of any other treatment to
render the product marketable to the consumer, shall amount to ‘manufacture’.
Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as well as Chapter Note 6 to Chapter
30 of Central Excise Tariff make it abundantly clear that repacking of pharmaceu-
ticals amounts to manufacture. Any activity which gets squarely covered under
the definition of ‘manufacture’ cannot be called as “repair or reconditioning” of
the products. Sl. No. 14 of Annexure-I to the impugned notification exempts the
products/goods imported within 3 years from the date of exportation only under
the condition that the goods are re-imported either for repair or for recondition-
ing. Hence when the goods are re-imported for an activity which amounts to
manufacture, such re-importation will not fall under the impugned notification.
Therefore, the exemption benefit of the notification cannot be extended to the
appellant.
8. The case laws as relied upon by the appellant have also been looked
into and we are of the opinion that the same are not applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the present case. We further observe that the said case laws ra-
ther support the Revenue’s stand by holding that repair means that “no new or
different goods emerge”.
9. The appellant also relied on C.B.E. & C.’s Circular No. 127/95, dated
14-12-1995. We do not find anything in this circular which extends the benefit of
the exemption Notification No. 52/2003 for re-importation of goods when those
are re-imported within 3 years of exportation for an activity which amounts to
manufacture. Further, we observe that the exemption notification being an ex-
emption to the general rule, must be construed strictly and benefit of doubt if
any must be given in favour of the Revenue and against the claimant, as held by
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dilipkumar (in Civil Appeal No. 3327/2007)
[2018 (361) E.L.T. 577 (S.C.)].
10. In view of the above, we find that the appellant is not entitled to the
benefit of exemption Notification No. 52/2003-Cus., dated 31-3-2003. Therefore,
there is no infirmity in the impugned order.
11. The appeal is rejected and the impugned order is upheld.
(Dictated and pronounced in open Court)
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