Page 168 - ELT_15th June 2020_VOL 372_Part 6th

846 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 372

permit “on an application made and disposed of”, the High Court
of Allahabad in Kanchan Singh v. S.T.A.T., Lucknow, AIR 1986 All 23
held that the word “made” means “filed” which implied receipt by
the authority concerned. Similarly, dealing with expression “made”
as contained in Section 66 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, the
High Court of Mysore held in Shanta Bai Devarao v. CIT - (1962) 46
ITR 272 (Mys.) that an application under Section 66(1) of the Act can
be deemed to have been ‘made’ only when that application is re-
ceived in the office of the Appellate Tribunal. An application posted
before the expiry of period of limitation and received by the office
of the Tribunal after the expiry of that period cannot be held to have
been ‘made’ within the prescribed period. Similarly, in Rishikesh v.
Salma Begum, (1995) 4 SCC 718, the Hon’ble Supreme Court ap-
proved the definition “make”, contained in the Collins English Dic-
tionary has meaning “to cause to exist.. to do in form of law; to per-
form with due formalities.. to execute in legal form; ..”
(e) The proscription contained in third provision to Section 127B of the
Customs Act, 1962 clearly attaches at the time of making of the ap-
plication before the Settlement Commission, and not at any prior or
later period of time including the date of the import of the goods.
Applications, in respect of items which are notified under Section
123 of the Act on the date when the applications are made, are statu-
torily incompetent, by virtue of the aforesaid third proviso to Sec-
tion 127B of the Customs Act.
(f) Thus, in view of these facts, once the goods in question are covered
under Section 123, in view of the aforesaid notification, no applica-
tion could have been preferred by the respondents under Section
127B of the Customs Act, 1962. The first application was preferred
on 16-8-2017, the second was preferred on 11-12-2017 and the third
application was preferred on 12-12-017 which are subsequent to the
aforesaid notification dated 25th July, 2016. Thus, by no stretch of
imagination it can be said that the Settlement Commission had any
power, jurisdiction and authority to decide an application preferred
by the respondent under Chapter XIV of the Customs Act, 1962.
Thus, the order dated 15th February, [2018] passed by the Settle-
ment Commission (Annexure P-1 to the memo of this writ petition)
de hors the jurisdiction. Hence, the same deserves to be quashed and
set aside.
(g) We are unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Saurabh Kapoor,
Advocate that the settlement application having been filed pursuant
to the liberty granted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana,
was ipso facto maintainable. It is obvious that the High Court of Pun-
jab and Haryana never entered into the aspect of maintainability of
the settlement application. In any event, as cigarettes were notified
prior to the filing of the settlement application, the applications
were expressly not maintainable. It is well settled that an order
passed by a Court cannot be so interpreted as permitting a statutory
authority to act in violation of the statute. We are unable, therefore,
to extend the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana as
permitting the Settlement Commission to entertain the application,
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