Page 218 - ELT_15th July 2020_Vol 373_Part 2

200 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 373

port and later file fresh bill of entry at the time of breaking up of the vessel
as per the condition attached to the aforesaid exemption. ”
She would therefore submit that since it was a requirement under the Customs
Act, the import manifest was filled in as a matter of compliance which cannot be
the basis for levying wharfage on the vessel itself when no cargo was unloaded
or shipped out by the vessel.
7. Moreover, the Learned Counsel would submit that subsequently in
May 2015, the position was clarified by the competent authority itself stating that
no wharfage can be levied on such vessels by insertion of note No. 10, after note
No. 9 under Scale 1 - Schedule of wharfage charges of Chapter-III - cargo related
charges as proposed by the Chennai Port Trust. In the said circumstances, alt-
hough the demand has been complied with as the vessel has to leave the Chennai
Port Trust after due clearance, the Port Trust authorities have to refund the
amount in view of the subsequent clarification which in effect that the original
demand itself was unauthorised and untenable. Therefore, the present writ peti-
tion has been filed to quash the order passed by the Chennai Port Trust dated
6-2-2015, levying wharfage on the vessel belonging to the petitioner Company
and for refund of the amount paid by the petitioner to the tune of Rs.
2,96,30,784/- along with interest at 18% per annum.
8. In the course of the arguments, the Learned Counsel for the petition-
er would rely on a decision reported in (2008) 9 SCC 622. She would draw the
attention of this Court to Paragraph Nos. 8, 19, 20 and 21 which are extracted
hereunder :-
“8. It would be of some relevance to take note of what this Court
said in Virtual’s case (supra). Pointing out one of the important tests at para
51 it was observed that even if the statute does contain a statement to the ef-
fect that the amendment is clarificatory or declaratory, that is not the end of
the matter. The Court has to analyse the nature of the amendment to come
to a conclusion whether it is in reality a clarificatory or declaratory provi-
sion. Therefore, the date from which the amendment is made operative
does not conclusively decide the question. The Court has to examine the
scheme of the statute prior to the amendment and subsequent to the
amendment to determine whether amendment is clarificatory or substan-
tive.
19. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 11th Edn. 2008, Justice
G.P. Singh has stated the position regarding retrospective operation of stat-
utes as follows :
“The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable
to declaratory statutes. As stated in Craies and approved by the Su-
preme Court : For modern purposes a declaratory Act may be de-
fined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or
the meaning or effect of any statute. Such Acts are usually held to
be retrospective. The usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to
set aside what Parliament deems to have been a judicial error,
whether in the statement of the common law or in the interpretation
of statutes. Usually, if not invariably, such an Act contains a pream-
ble, and also the word ‘declared’ as well as the word ‘enacted’. But
the use of the words ‘it is declared’ is not conclusive that the Act is
declaratory for these words may, at times, be used to introduce new
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