Page 258 - ELT_15th July 2020_Vol 373_Part 2

240 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 373

public inquiry. The decision itself is administrative, dictated by pol-
icy and expediency. But the procedure is subject to the principles of
natural justice, which require the minister to act fairly towards the
objections and not (for example) to take fresh evidence without dis-
closing it to them. A quasi-judicial decision is therefore an adminis-
trative decision which is subject to some measure of judicial proce-
dure.”
28. We do not find any merit in the submission. At the outset, it must be home in
mind that another test which distinguishes administrative function from quasi-
judicial function is, the authority who acts quasi-judicially is required to act ac-
cording to the rules, whereas the authority which acts administratively is dictated
by the policy and expediency. In the present case, the Election Commission is
not required to register a political party in accordance with any policy or
expediency but strictly in accordance with the statutory provisions. The
afore-quoted passage from Administrative Law by Wade & Lorsyth is
wholly inapplicable to the present case. Rather, it goes against the argu-
ment of Learned Counsel for the respondent. The afore-quoted passage
shows that where an authority whose decision is dictated by policy and ex-
pediency exercises administratively although it may be exercising functions
in some respects as if it were judicial, which is not the case here.”
(emphasis supplied).
14. It cannot be disputed that the powers vested with the adjudicating
authority to be exercised for considering the prayer for provisional release of
goods is circumscribed with well-settled principles of law governing the same.
Such an order is not based on any policy, rather on settled principles of law. The-
se orders cannot be issued mechanically, rather many factors are required to be
considered such as the nature of goods, seriousness of offence, whether the
goods being imported are prohibited, etc. etc. Any such order passed has civil
consequences, hence, it cannot be opined that the same is passed by the adjudi-
cating authority in exercise of its administrative powers rather it has rightly been
opined by the Tribunal that the exercise of powers by the Commissioner under
Section 110A of the Act is quasi judicial in nature and so the order passed.
15. The language of Section 110A(l)(a) of the Customs Act is quite wide
in its application to take within its umbrella such an order passed, against which
appeal would lie to the Tribunal. Restrictive meaning as is suggested by the Rev-
enue cannot be given to the provisions. Power of judicial review in exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India is
altogether different and cannot be compared with a statutory right of appeal
where the scope of interference is larger. The terms used in Section 129(l)(a) of
the Customs Act are ‘decision’ or ‘orders’. Meaning thereby it is not limited to
any final decision.
16. Similar view has been expressed by Delhi High Court in the case of
Gurdeep Kaur passed in WP (C) 4152/2015 on 17-9-2015 [2015 (325) E.L.T. 490
(Del.)] and in Cantex Chemical Fibres Private Limited, 2014 (310) E.L.T. 50, by Raja-
sthan High Court in the case of Shivmahal Textiles Private Limited in CWP No.
4946/2012, decided on 18-12-2012 and Gentleman Suitings Private Limited, 2012
(12) TMI1001.
17. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not find any substantial
question of law arises in the present appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed.
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EXCISE LAW TIMES  15th July 2020  258