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2020 ] PRINCE SPINTEX PVT. LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA 269
10. As we find that the compounded rubber was also rescinded by the
same Notification dated 1-3-1994 and reintroduced in the same manner vi-
de another Notification issued on 28-3-1994, ratio of W.P.I.L. Ltd. Case shall
squarely apply to the present case as well. As a result, only on this ground,
these appeals are allowed and the demand raised against the appellants is
quashed.”
3.7 It was submitted that if Notification No. 26/2017-Cus. has to be
read independently as imposing a restriction, the notification falls foul of prom-
issory estoppel held out to the petitioner. It was submitted that representation is
made in the Foreign Trade Policy that the petitioner is entitled to exemption; and
the notification to operationalise such representation would be subject to promis-
sory estoppel. It was submitted that it is also possible to construe the deletion
and addition as interpreted by this Court in the case of Shree Renuka Sugars Ltd. v.
Union of India (supra).
3.8 Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in
MRF Ltd., Kottayam v. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) Sales Tax and Others,
(2006) 8 SCC 702 = 2006 (206) E.L.T. 6 (S.C.), wherein the Court held thus :-
“36. In Kasinka Trading case, (1995) 1 SCC 274, the notification in question
was a customs exemption notification for a fixed period. The judgments in
Pournami Oils Mills’s case, 1986 Supp SCC 728 and Shri Bakul Oil Industries’s
case, (1987) 1 SCC 31, were distinguished in the said case on the ground
that the notifications in those cases were incentive notifications. It was ob-
served in para 27 :
“Again in Bakul Oil Industries (supra) it was the incentive to set up in-
dustries in a conforming area that the exemption had been granted
and the Court held that the Government could withdraw an exemp-
tion granted by it earlier only if such withdrawal could be made
without offending the rule of promissory estoppel and without de-
priving an industry entitled to claim exemption for the entire speci-
fied period for which exemption had been promised to it at the time
of giving incentive. Both these cases therefore cannot advance the
case of the appellant and are distinguishable on facts because the ex-
emption notification under Section 25 of the Act which was issued in
this case did not hold out any incentive for setting up of any industry
to use PVC resins and on the other hand had been issued in exercise
of the statutory powers, in public interest and subsequently with-
drawn in exercise of the same powers again in public interest. In our
opinion, no justifiable prejudice was caused to the appellants in the
absence of any unequivocal promise by the Government not to act
and review its policy even if the necessity warranted and the “public
interest” so demanded. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of these
cases, the appellants cannot invoke the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel to question the withdrawal notification issued under Section 25 of
the said Act.”
[Emphasis supplied]
37. The decision in Kasinka Trading (supra) has been distinguished in the
later decision by this Court in State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd., 2004 (6)
SCC 465, on the ground of the inherent nature of an exemption notification
issued under Section 25 of the Customs Act. Even in respect of a notifica-
tion under Section 25 of the Customs Act this Court has taken the view that
the withdrawal even of such a notification must not be “arbitrary” or “un-
reasonable” [see Dai-Ichi Karkaria Ltd. v. Union of India, 2000 (4) SCC 57].

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