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528 GST LAW TIMES [ Vol. 35
the Court within the said period. However, the Supreme Court in the case of
Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and
Others - (2008) 7 SCC 169, while considering Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 observed that
“When any special statute prescribes certain period of limitation as well as
provision for extension up to specified time limit, on sufficient cause being
shown, then the period of limitation prescribed under the special law shall
prevail, and to that extent the provisions of the Limitation Act shall stand
excluded.”
Further, in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India
(P) Ltd. - (2009) 5 SCC 791 = 2009 (236) E.L.T. 417 (S.C.), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court considered the question whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be
invoked for condonation of delay in filing an appeal or reference to the High
Court and observed thus :
“As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G
and 35H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High
Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communica-
tion of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other
provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appel-
late authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30
days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for
preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by
showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete ex-
clusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore,
justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after ex-
piry of the prescribed period of 180 days.”
15. In view of the above settled legal position, it is evident that this
Appellate Authority being a creature of the statue is empowered to condone a
delay of only a period of 30 days after the expiry of the initial period for filing
appeal. As far as the language of Section 100 of the CGST Act is concerned, the
crucial words are “not exceeding thirty days” used in the proviso to sub-section
(2). To hold that this Appellate Authority could entertain this appeal beyond the
extended period under the proviso would render the phrase “not exceeding thir-
ty days” wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
Therefore, we hold that we are not empowered to condone the delay of one day
in filing this appeal.
16. Since the appeal cannot be allowed to be presented on account of
time limitation, the question of discussing the merits of the issue in appeal does
not arise.
17. In view of the above we pass the following order
ORDER
18. We dismiss the appeal filed by the appellant The Deputy Conserva-
tor of Forests, Bangalore Urban Division, Department of Forest, Government of
Karnataka, Aranya Bhavan, 18th Cross, Malleshwaram, Bangalore-560003, on
grounds of time limitation.

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