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2020 ]  COMMR. OF C. EX., NAGPUR v. UNIVERSAL FERRO & ALLIED CHEMICALS LTD.  19

               pearing for the appellant-Revenue and Shri M.H. Patil, Learned Counsel appear-
               ing on behalf of the respondent - UFAC.
                       14.  The main contention raised by Shri Radhakrishnan, Learned Senior
               Counsel on behalf of the Revenue is that, in view of proviso to sub-section (1) of
               Section 3 of the Act, the duty which is liable to be levied and collected on any
               excisable goods manufactured by a 100% EOU and brought to any other place in
               India shall be leviable as per the duties of Customs, which are leviable under the
               Customs Act, 1962 on like goods produced and manufactured outside India, if
               imported into India. It is contended, that the proviso to Section 5A of the said Act
               specifically provides, that no exemption granted under Section 5A shall apply to
               the excisable goods which are produced or manufactured by a 100% EOU and
               brought to any other place in India. He further submits, that in the transaction
               between the UFAC and TISCO, there is no transfer of property in goods to the
               UFAC and, as such, it cannot be considered to be a sale under Section 4 of the
               Sale of Goods Act, 1930. The Learned Senior Counsel therefore submits, that the
               order passed by the CESTAT deserves to be set aside and the orders-in-original
               passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) need to be maintained.
                       15.  It is further contended by Shri  Radhakrishnan, Learned  Senior
               Counsel, that the words “allowed to be sold in India” in clause (ii) of proviso to
               sub-section (1) of Section 5A of the Act have been substituted by words “brought
               to any other place in India” with effect from 11-5-2001. He therefore submits, that
               in view of change in law from 11-5-2001, the statutory force of the said Exemp-
               tion Notification is lost from 11-5-2001. In his submission, the  said Exemption
               Notification would stand impliedly repealed with effect from 11-5-2001. He relies
               on the judgments of this Court in the cases of (1) M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India
               & Anr., (1979) 3 SCC 431; (2) Dharangadhra Chemical Works v. Dharangadhara Mu-
               nicipality and Anr.  (1985)  4 SCC 92; and (3)  Ratan Lal Adukia v.  Union of India,
               (1989) 3 SCC 537. He further submits, that the terms “allowed to be sold in India”
               and “brought to any other place in India” have been considered by this Court in
               the cases of Siv Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs [(2000) 3
               SCC 367 = 2000 (117) E.L.T. 281 (S.C.)] and Sarla Performance Fibers Limited and
               Ors.  v.  Commissioner of Central Excise,  Surat-II [(2016)  11 SCC 635  = 2016  (336)
               E.L.T. 577 (S.C.)] and as such, the UFAC would be liable to pay duty as if the
               goods were imported into India.
                       16.  Shri M.H. Patil, on the contrary submits, that the case of the present
               appellant is covered by paragraph 9.9(b) of the EXIM Policy and not by para-
               graph  9.17(b) of the EXIM Policy. He further submits, that  all the transactions
               made by UFAC were made only after the valid permissions were granted by the
               Joint Development Commissioner,  SEEPZ. Learned Counsel further submits,
               though initially vide Circular dated 14-9-1998 (No. 67/98-Cus.) the permission to
               undertake job work to EOU/EPZ from the DTA units was restricted only to units
               in textile, readymade garments, agroprocessing  and granite  sectors and subse-
               quently vide Circular dated 5-11-1999 (No. 74/99-Cus.) it was extended to certain
               other units;  by a subsequent Circular  dated  22-5-2000  (No. 49/2000-Cus.), the
               said  facility  was  extended to all the sectors. He submits, that this  fact has  not
               been taken into consideration by the Authority passing the Orders-in-Original. It
               is submitted that the Sponsoring Authority i.e. the Development Commissioner,
               SEEPZ had clarified the position that the activity which was carried out by the
               UFAC was permissible under paragraph 9.9(b) of the EXIM Policy.

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