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20 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 372

17. To counter the submission that there is no transfer of property in
goods, Shri Patil submits, that the ‘sale’ and ‘purchase’ in the present case will
have to be construed with reference to the definition of ‘sale’ and ‘purchase’ un-
der the Central Excise Act and not under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Lastly, Shri
Patil submits, that UFAC is entitled to the benefits of said Exemption Notification
and, as such, the findings as recorded by the Learned CESTAT warrant no inter-
ference.
18. We shall first deal with the submission of Shri K. Radhakrishnan,
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Revenue, to the effect that since in the
transaction between UFAC and TISCO there is no transfer of property in goods,
the same cannot be termed as ‘sale’ and therefore would not be covered under
paragraph 9.9(b) of the EXIM Policy. Shri Radhakrishnan, in that respect, would
rely on the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.
19. We do not find any merit in the submission of Shri Radhakrishnan
in this regard. It will be relevant to note that clause (h) of Section 2 of the Central
Excise Act, 1944 specifically defines the terms ‘sale’ and ‘purchase’. Section 2(h)
of the Act reads thus :
“2(h) “sale” and “purchase”, with their grammatical variations and cog-
nate expressions, mean any transfer of the possession of goods by one per-
son to another in the ordinary course of trade or business for cash or de-
ferred payment or other valuable consideration;”
20. The perusal of the definition makes it clear that when there is a
transfer of possession of goods in the ordinary course of trade or business either
for cash or for deferred payment or any other valuable consideration, the same
would be covered by the terms ‘sale’ and ‘purchase’ within the meaning of the
Central Excise Act, 1944. Undisputedly, in the present case, there is a transfer of
Manganese Ore by TISCO to UFAC for the purposes of processing the same and
converting it into Silicon Manganese. Undisputedly, the same is also for a valua-
ble consideration.
21. In this respect, it will be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi v. Connaught Plaza
Restaurant Private Limited, New Delhi [(2012) 13 SCC 639 = 2012 (286) E.L.T. 321
(S.C.)] wherein this Court observed thus :
“46. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submission. It
is a settled principle in excise classification that the definition of one statute
having a different object, purpose and scheme cannot be applied mechani-
cally to another statute. As aforesaid, the object of the Excise Act is to raise
revenue for which various goods are differently classified in the Act. The
conditions or restrictions contemplated by one statute having a different
object and purpose should not be lightly and mechanically imported and
applied to a fiscal statute for non-levy of excise duty, thereby causing a loss
of revenue. [See Medley Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. CCE and Customs [(2011) 2
SCC 601] (SCC p. 614, para 31) and CCE v. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhavan
Ltd. [(2009) 12 SCC 419] The provisions of PFA, dedicated to food adultera-
tion, would require a technical and scientific understanding of “ice cream”
and thus, may require different standards for a good to be marketed as
“ice-cream”. These provisions are for ensuring quality control and have
nothing to do with the class of goods which are subject to excise duty under
a particular tariff entry under the Tariff Act. These provisions are not a

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