Page 140 - ELT_1_1st April 2020_Vol 372_Part

26 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 372
produced or manufactured outside India if imported into India and where the
said duties of Customs are chargeable by reference to their value, the value of
such excisable goods shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other
provision of this Act, be determined in accordance with the provisions of the
Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
43. Relying on the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, it is
the contention of Shri Radhakrishnan that since UFAC has supplied the goods to
TISCO, which is any other place in India, it will be liable to pay the import duty
as if the goods were imported in India.
44. However, for considering the said submission, it will also be neces-
sary to refer to Section 5A of the Act, which is already reproduced above. Sub-
section (1) of Section 5A of the Act provides, that if the Central Government is
satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, it may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, exempt generally either absolutely or subject to such con-
ditions, to be fulfilled before or after removal, as may be specified in the notifica-
tion, excisable goods of any specified description from the whole or any part of
the duty of excise leviable thereon. The proviso thereto provides, that unless spe-
cifically provided in such notification, no exemption therein shall apply to excis-
able goods which are produced or manufactured in a free trade zone or a special
economic zone and brought to any other place in India; or by a hundred per cent
export-oriented undertaking and brought to any other place in India.
45. It is the submission of Shri Radhakrishnan that a combined reading
of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act and proviso to sub-section (1)
of Section 5A of the Act, would not entitle the Central Government to grant any
exemption to an EOU when it brings the goods to any other place in India (i.e.
DTA) and the duty that would be leviable would be as if the said goods were
imported in India.
46. We are of the considered view, that if such an interpretation is ac-
cepted, the words “unless specifically provided in such notification” in sub-
section (1) of Section 5A will have to be ignored and the said words would be
rendered otiose. It is a settled principle of law that while interpreting a provision
due weightage will have to be given to each and every word used in the statute.
47. In this respect, we may gainfully refer to the following observations
of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Hardeep Singh v. State of
Punjab and Others [(2014) 3 SCC 92] :
“42. To say that powers under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised only
during trial would be reducing the impact of the word “inquiry” by the
court. It is a settled principle of law that an interpretation which leads to the
conclusion that a word used by the legislature is redundant, should be
avoided as the presumption is that the legislature has deliberately and con-
sciously used the words for carrying out the purpose of the Act. The legal
maxim a verbis legis non est recedendum which means, “from the words of
law, there must be no departure” has to be kept in mind.
43. The court cannot proceed with an assumption that the legislature en-
acting the statute has committed a mistake and where the language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous, the court cannot go behind the language
of the statute so as to add or subtract a word playing the role of a political
reformer or of a wise counsel to the legislature. The court has to proceed on
the footing that the legislature intended what it has said and even if there is
some defect in the phraseology, etc., it is for others than the court to remedy
EXCISE LAW TIMES  1st April 2020  188