Page 143 - ELT_1_1st April 2020_Vol 372_Part

2020 ] COMMR. OF C. EX., NAGPUR v. UNIVERSAL FERRO & ALLIED CHEMICALS LTD. 29

“(1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions;
(2) Whether the legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive code in
respect of the subject matter replacing the earlier law;
(3) Whether the two laws occupy the same field.”
The said view has been consistently followed by this Court in catena of
judgments.
55. We do not find, that there would be any conflict in the amended
provisions of clause (ii) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 5A of the Act
and the said Exemption Notification. In any case, by the 2001 Amendment, the
legislature has not laid down any exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter
in replacing the earlier law. It appears, that the said Amendment has been incor-
porated to bring the said clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 5A in sync with
the words used in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 5A of the
Act and the words used in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act.
In that view of the matter, we find, that the said contention is without substance.
56. Insofar as the reliance placed by the Learned Senior Counsel on the
judgment of this Court in the case of Siv Industries Ltd. (supra) so as to distin-
guish the terms “allowed to be sold in India” and “brought to any other place in
India” is concerned, we find, that the said judgment would rather support the
case of the respondent-Assessee. It would be relevant to refer to the following
observation in paragraph 18 of the said judgment, which reads thus :
“Thus it is apparent that debonding and permission to sell in India are two
different things having no connection with each other. It also becomes ap-
parent that in view of the EOU Scheme as modified from time to time and
corresponding amendments to Section 3 of the Act the expression “allowed
to be sold in India” in the proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act is applicable on-
ly to sales made up to 25% of production by 100% EOU in DTA and with
the permission of the Development Commissioner. No permission is re-
quired to sell goods manufactured by 100% EOU lying with it at the time
approval is granted to debond.”
57. It is to be noted that the case that fell for consideration before this
Court was with regard to debonding. What this Court has held is, that no per-
mission is required to sell goods manufactured by 100% EOU lying with it, at the
time approval is granted to debond. It has been held, that the expression “al-
lowed to be sold in India” in the proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act was applicable
only to sales made upto 25% of production by 100% EOU in DTA and with the
permission of the Development Commissioner. Admittedly, in the present case,
the sales made by UFAC to TISCO are within the permissible limits and with the
permission of the Development Commissioner.
58. The view taken by this Court in the case of Sarla Performance Fibers
Limited (supra) is a similar view, taken following the decision of this Court in Siv
Industries Ltd. (supra). As such, the said judgment also is of no assistance to the
case of the appellant.
59. In that view of the matter, we do not find, that the CESTAT has
committed any error in reversing the orders-in-original passed by the Commis-
sioner. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed.
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EXCISE LAW TIMES  1st April 2020  191