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296 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 372

of which any process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power, it would not
be treated as use of ‘power’.
50. The words now used in the Tariff Act and the Exemption Notifica-
tion are also ‘in or in relation to the manufacture of which, no process has been
carried on with the aid of power’. The meaning of the expression ‘power’ will,
therefore, not change even if fresh Circulars have not been issued by the Board to
clarify the meaning of the expression ‘power’. The Commissioner was, therefore,
not justified in ignoring the meaning assigned to the expression ‘power’ under
the aforesaid two Circulars merely because they have been withdrawn because
the Board had clearly expressed its views in the aforesaid two Circulars regard-
ing the meaning of the expression ‘power’. There is nothing in the present Tariff
Act which would justify assigning any other meaning to the expression ‘power’
from that which was assigned in the two Circulars.
51. Learned Counsel for the Appellant also submitted that the Tariff
Item and the Exemption Notification refer to use of both ‘power’ and ‘steam’.
According to the Learned Counsel for the Appellant, ‘steam’ is also a source or
form of energy and, therefore, if ‘power’ is understood and interpreted to include
any source or form of energy, then ‘steam’ also gets covered by the expression
‘power’ and if that be so, reference to ‘steam’ separately in the Tariff Act and the
Notification becomes redundant. Thus, according to the Learned Counsel that
meaning to the expression ‘power’ has to be given which prevents such redun-
dancy.
52. This submission of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant deserves
to be accepted. If the intention was to give ‘power’ a wide meaning, then there
would have been no necessity to include ‘steam’ in the Tariff Item and the Ex-
emption Notification.
53. It is, therefore, clear that only a restrictive meaning to the expres-
sion ‘power’ should be given which is not only in consonance with common par-
lance, but also in consonance with the Hindi version of the Tariff Act and the
Exemption Notification as also the Circulars, referred to above.
54. The position that emerges from the aforesaid discussion is that
‘power’ used in Chapter 34 of the Tariff Act and the Exemption Notification dat-
ed 24 February, 2015 would be restricted to ‘electricity’. The Appellant is en-
gaged in the manufacture of ‘soap’ with the aid of gas and, therefore, no process
has been carried on with the aid of ‘power. The manufacture of ‘soap’ by the Ap-
pellant, therefore, would be subjected to ‘NIL’ rate of duty upto 27 February,
2005 and thereafter also would be subjected to ‘NIL’ rate of duty because of the
exemption Notification dated 24 February, 2005. The Commissioner has, howev-
er, confirmed the demand by order dated 15 November, 2006 holding that the
Appellant has been manufacturing ‘soap’ with the aid of ‘power’.
55. In such circumstances, it is not possible to sustain the demand
made in the impugned order. The imposition of penalty on the Appellant, the
Factory Manager, the Authorized Signatory and the Managing Director are also
not sustainable.
56. Such being the position, it is not necessary to examine the conten-
tion of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant regarding invocation of the ex-

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