Page 54 - ELT_2nd_15th April 2020_Vol 372_Part

A70 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 372

In spite of the width of power conferred by Art. 142, the Constitution Bench
took the view that suspending the advocate from practice and suspending his
license was not within the sweep of the power under the said article and
overruled the judgment in Re V. C. Mishra’s case (supra).
47. In M.S. Ahlwat’s case (supra), the petitioner, who was found guilty of
forging signatures and making false statements at different stages before this
Court, was inflicted punishment under S. 193, I.P.C. in Afzal v. State of Harya-
na [1996 (7) SCC 397]. He filed an application under Art. 32 of the Constitu-
tion assailing the validity of that order. Taking note of the complaint of mis-
carriage of justice by the Supreme Court in ordering his incarceration which
ruined his career, acting without jurisdiction or without following the due
procedure, it was observed that to perpetuate an error was no virtue but to
correct it was a compulsion of judicial conscience. The correctness of the
judgment was examined and the error was rectified.
48. In the cases discussed above this Court reconsidered its earlier judg-
ments, inter alia, under Arts. 129 and 142 which confer very wide powers on
this Court to do complete justice betweeen the parties. We have already indi-
cated above that the scope of the power of this Court under Art. 139 as a
Court of record and also adverted to the extent of power under Art. 142 of the
Constitution.
49. The upshot of the discussion in our view is that this Court, to prevent
abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, may reconsider
its judgments in exercise of its inherent power.
50. The next step is to specify the requirements to entertain such a curative
petition under the inherent power of this Court so that floodgates are not
opened for filing a second review petition as a matter of course in the guise of
a curative petition under inherent power. It is common ground that except
when very strong reasons exist, the Court should not entertain an application
seeking reconsideration of an order of this Court which has become final on
dismissal of a review petition. It is neither advisable nor possible to enumer-
ate all the grounds on which such a petition may be entertained.
51. Nevertheless, we think that a petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito
justitiae if he establishes (1) violation of principles of natural justice in that he
was not a party to the lis but the judgment adversely affected his interests or,
if he was a party to the lis, he was not served with notice of the proceedings
and the matter proceeded as if he had notice and (2) where in the proceedings
a learned Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or the
parties giving scope for an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely
affects the petitioner.
52. The petitioner, in the curative petition, shall ever specifically that the
grounds mentioned therein had been taken in the review petition and that it
was dismissed by circulation. The curative petition shall contain a certifica-
tion by a Senior Advocate with regard to the fulfilment of the above require-
ments.
53. We are of the view that since the matter relates to re-examination of a fi-
nal judgment of this court, though on limited ground, the curative petition
has to be first circulated to a Bench of the three senior-most Judges and the
Judges who passed the judgment complained of, if available. It is only when a
majority of the learned Judges on this Bench conclude that the matters needs
hearing that it should be listed before the same Bench (as far as possible)
which may pass appropriate orders. It shall be open to the Bench at any stage
EXCISE LAW TIMES  15th April 2020  70