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42. The concern of this Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less im-
portant than the principle of finality of its judgment. We are faced with com-
peting principles ensuring certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court of
last resort and dispensing justice on reconsideration of a judgment on the
ground that it is vitiated being in violation of the principle of natural justice
or apprehension of bias due to a Judge who participated in decision-making
process not disclosing his links with a party to the case, or abuse of the pro-
cess of the Court. Such a judgment, far from ensuring finality, will always
remain under the cloud of uncertainty. Almighty alone is the dispenser of ab-
solute justice - a concept which is not disputed but by a few. We are of the
view that though Judges of the highest Court do their best, subject of course
to the limitation of human falliblity, yet situations may arise, in the rarest of
the rare cases, which would require reconsideration of a final judgment to set
right miscarriage of justice complained of. In such case it would not only be
proper but also obligatory both legally and morally to rectify the error. After
giving our anxious consideration to the question we are perusaded to hold
that the duty to do justice in these rarest of rare cases shall have to prevail
over the policy of certainty of judgment as though it is essentially in public in-
terest that a final judgment of the final Court in the country should not be
open to challenge yet there may be circumstances, as mentioned above,
wherein declining to reconsider the judgment would be oppressive to judicial
conscience and cause perpetuation of irremediable injustice.
43. It may be useful to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court of United
States in Ohio Power Company’s case (supra). In that case the Court of claims
entered judgment for refund of tax, alleged to have been overpaid, in favour
of the taxpayer. On the application of the Government a writ of certiorari
against that judgment was declined by the Supreme Court of United States in
October, 1955. The Government sought rehearing of the case by filing another
application which was dismissed in December, 1955. A second petition for
hearing was also rejected in May, 1956. However, in June, 1956 the order
passed in December, 1955 was set aside sua sponte (of its own motion) and
that case was ordered to be heard along with two other pending cases in
which the same question was presented. In those two cases the Supreme
Court held against the taxpayer and, on the authority of that judgment, re-
versed the judgment of the Court of claims. Four learned members of the
Court in per curiam opinion, rested the decision “on the ground of interest in
finality of the decision must yield where the interest of justice so required.”
Three learned members dissented and held that denial of certiorari had be-
come final and ought not to be disturbed. Two learned members, however,
did not participate.
44. This Court in Harbans Singh’s case (supra), on an application under Art.
32 of the Constitution filed after the dismissal of special leave petition and the
review, reconsidered its judgment. In that case, among others, the petitioner
and another person were convicted under S. 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced to
death. In the case of one of the remaining two convicts, the Supreme Court
commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. While staying the death
sentence of the petitioner, A.N. Sen, J. in his concurring opinion, noticed the
dismissal of the petitioner’s special leave, review petitions and the petition for
clemency by the President and observed :
“Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court for due and
proper administration of justice. Apart from the jurisdiction and
powers conferred on this Court under Arts. 32 and 136 of the Con-
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