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344 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 372

pressly or by necessary implication. The aforesaid power of the legislature
is qualified further that such a unilateral alteration of service conditions
should be in conformity with legal and constitutional provisions. (Vide
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India [AIR 1967 SC 1889], State of Mysore v.
M.H. Krishna Murthy [(1973) 3 SCC 559 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 190 : AIR 1973 SC
1146], Raj Kumar v. Union of India [(1975) 4 SCC 13 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 198 :
AIR 1975 SC 1116], K.C. Arora v. State of Haryana [(1984) 3 SCC 281 : 1984
SCC (L&S) 520] and State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni [(1983) 2
SCC 33 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 231 : AIR 1984 SC 161].)
25. In Union of India v. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty [(1994) 5 SCC 450 : 1994 SCC
(L&S) 1118 : (1994) 27 ATC 892] this Court declared the amendment with
retrospective operation as ultra vires as it takes away the vested rights of the
petitioners therein and thus, was unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. While deciding the said case, this
Court placed very heavy reliance on the judgment in P.D. Aggarwal v. State
of U.P. [(1987) 3 SCC 622 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 310 : (1987) 4 ATC 272 : AIR 1987
SC 1676] wherein this Court has held as under : (SCC p. 639, para 18)
“18. ... the Government has the power to make retrospective
amendments to the Rules but if the Rules purport to take away the
vested rights and are arbitrary and not reasonable then such retro-
spective amendments are subject to judicial scrutiny if they have in-
fringed Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.”
26. In the instant case, the 2006 Amendment Act is not under challenge.
However, the issue agitated by the appellant has been that the legislature
never intended to apply the amended provisions with retrospective effect
and therefore, the appellant could not be discontinued from the post. His
rights stood protected by the provisions of Section 6 of the 1897 Act. The is-
sue of applicability of the said provision has been considered by this Court
in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh [AIR 1955 SC 84 :1955 Cri LJ 254], M.S.
Shivananda v. Karnataka SRTC [(1980) 1 SCC 149 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR
1980 SC 77], CIT v. Shah Sadiq and Sons [(1987) 3 SCC 516 : 1987 SCC (Tax)
270 : AIR 1987 SC 1217] and Vishwant Kumar v. Madan Lal Sharma [(2004) 4
SCC 1 : AIR 2004 SC 1887], wherein it has been held that the rights accrued
under the Act/Ordinance which stood repealed would continue to exist un-
less it has specifically or by necessary implication been taken away by the
repealing Act. ”
8. He has also placed reliance on Section 6(c) of the General Clauses
Act, 1897, which provides that where the said Act or any Central Act or regula-
tion, made after the commencement of General Clauses Act, 1897 repeals any
enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different inten-
tion appears, the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability
acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. He, therefore,
submits that the right accrued in favour of the petitioner to have seven attempts
at the examination under the 2013 regulations, could not be curtailed by the 2018
regulations. Similarly, the right to appear for interview in two years could not be
curtailed to one.
9. Having heard the Learned Counsels and examined the record in-
cluding regulations of 2013 and 2018, and Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act,
1987, we are of the view that there is no merit in this petition.
10. The main thrust of the arguments of Mr. Qadri, is premised on a
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