Page 123 - ELT_15th May 2020_VOL 372_Part 4th

2020 ] UNION OF INDIA v. V.V.F. LTD. 513

authority “to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law
or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Govern-
ment or of the public authority to make”. There is preponderance of judicial
opinion that to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound and
positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking
the doctrine and that bald expressions, without any supporting material, to
the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doc-
trine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government
would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. In our opinion, the
doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the
courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be
achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the ap-
plicability of the doctrine, the courts have to do equity and the fundamental
principles of equity must forever be present to the mind of the court, while
considering the applicability of the doctrine. The doctrine must yield when
the equity so demands if it can be shown having regard to the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case that it would be inequitable to hold the Government
or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation.
20. The facts of the appeals before us are not analogous to the facts
in Indo-Afghan Agencies [(1968) 2 SCR 366 : AIR 1968 SC 718] or M.P. Sugar
Mills [(1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144 : (1979) 2 SCR 641]. In the first
case the petitioner therein had acted upon the unequivocal promises held
out to it and exported goods on the specific assurance given to it and it was
in that fact situation that it was held that Textile Commissioner who had
enunciated the scheme was bound by the assurance thereof and obliged to
carry out the promise made thereunder. As already noticed, in the present
batch of cases neither the notification is of an executive character nor does it
represent a scheme designed to achieve a particular purpose. It was a noti-
fication issued in public interest and again withdrawn in public interest. So
far as the second case (M.P. Sugar Mills case [(1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC
(Tax) 144 : (1979) 2 SCR 641] ) is concerned the facts were totally different.
In the correspondence exchanged between the State and the petitioners
therein it was held out to the petitioners that the industry would be ex-
empted from sales tax for a particular number of initial years but when the
State sought to levy the sales tax it was held by this Court that it was pre-
cluded from doing so because of the categorical representation made by it
to the petitioners through letters in writing, who had relied upon the same
and set up the industry.
23. The appellants appear to be under the impression that even if, in
the altered market conditions the continuance of the exemption may not
have been justified, yet, Government was bound to continue it to give extra
profit to them. That certainly was not the object with which the notification
had been issued. The withdrawal of exemption “in public interest” is a mat-
ter of policy and the courts would not bind the Government to its policy
decisions for all times to come, irrespective of the satisfaction of the Gov-
ernment that a change in the policy was necessary in the “public interest”.
The courts, do not interfere with the fiscal policy where the Government
acts in “public interest” and neither any fraud or lack of bona fides is alleged
much less established. The Government has to be left free to determine the
priorities in the matter of utilisation of finances and to act in the public in-
terest while issuing or modifying or withdrawing an exemption notification
under Section 25(1) of the Act.”
EXCISE LAW TIMES  15th May 2020  123