Page 124 - ELT_15th May 2020_VOL 372_Part 4th

514 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 372

Thus, it can be seen that this Court has specifically and clearly held that the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the courts are
bound to consider all aspects including the objective to be achieved and the pub-
lic good at large. It has been held that while considering the applicability of the
doctrine, the courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity
must forever be present to the mind of the court, while considering the applica-
bility of the doctrine. It is further held that the doctrine must yield when the
equity so demands if it can be shown having regard to the facts and circumstanc-
es of the case that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the public
authority to its promise, assurance or representation. It is further held that an
exemption notification does not make items which are subject to levy of customs
duty etc. as items not leviable to such duty. It only suspends the levy and collec-
tion of customs duty, etc., wholly or partially and subject to such conditions as
may be laid down in the notification by the Government in “public interest”.
Such an exemption by its very nature is susceptible of being revoked or modified
or subjected to other conditions. The supersession or revocation of an exemption
notification in the “public interest” is an exercise of the statutory power of the
State under the law itself. It has been further held that under the General Clauses
Act an authority which has the power to issue a notification has the undoubted
power to rescind or modify the notification in a like manner. It has been ob-
served that the withdrawal of exemption “in public interest” is a matter of policy
and the courts would not bind the Government to its policy decisions for all
times to come, irrespective of the satisfaction of the Government that a change in
the policy was necessary in the “public interest”. It has been held that where the
Government acts in “public interest” and neither any fraud or lack of bona fides is
alleged, much less established, it would not be appropriated for the Court to in-
terfere with the same.
11.2 In the case of Shrijee Sales Corporation (supra), it is observed and
held that the principle of promissory estoppel may be applicable against the
Government. But the determination of applicability of promissory estoppel
against public authority/Government hinges upon balance of equity or “public
interest”. In case there is a supervening public interest, the Government would
be allowed to change its stand; it would then be able to withdraw from represen-
tation made by it which induced persons to take certain steps which may have
gone adverse to the interest of such persons on account of such withdrawal.
Once public interest is accepted as the superior equity which can override indi-
vidual equity, the aforesaid principle should be applicable even in cases where a
period has been indicated for operation of the promise.
11.3 In the case of Shree Durga Oil Mills (supra), it has been held that
when the withdrawal of exemption is in public interest, the public interest must
override any consideration of private loss or gain. In the said case, the change in
policy and withdrawal of the exemption on the ground of severe resource crunch
have been found to be a valid ground and to be in public interest.
11.4 In the case of Mahaveer Oil Industries (supra), after considering the
decision of this Court in the case of Kasinka Trading (supra), a similar view has
been taken and it has been observed that public interest requires that the State be
held bound by the promise held out by it in such a situation. But this does not
preclude the State from withdrawing the benefit prospectively even during the
period of the scheme, if public interest so requires. Even in a case where a party
has acted on the promise, if there is any supervening public interest which
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