Page 37 - ELT_15th May 2020_VOL 372_Part 4th

2020 ] DOING COMPLETE JUSTICE IN ANY CAUSE OR MATTER UNDER ARTICLE 142 A129

ty; that it cannot be limited or restricted by provisions contained in statutory law;
that what would be the need of “complete justice” in a cause or matter would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and while exercising that
power the Court would take into consideration the express provisions of a sub-
stantive statute; that power of this Court under Article 142 coupled with the ple-
nary and residuary powers under Articles 32 and 136 embraces power to quash
criminal proceedings pending before any Court to do complete justice in the mat-
ter before this Court :
“50….The inherent power of this Court under Article 142 coupled with the
plenary and residuary powers under Articles 32 and 136 embraces power to
quash criminal proceedings pending before any Court to do complete justice
in the matter before this Court. If the Court is satisfied that the proceedings in
a criminal case are being utilised for oblique purposes or if the same are con-
tinued on manufactured and false evidence or if no case is made out on the
admitted facts, it would be in the ends of justice to set aside or quash the
criminal proceedings. It is idle to suggest that in such a situation this Court
should be a helpless spectator.
51. Mr. Nariman urged that Article 142(1) does not contemplate any order
contrary to statutory provisions. He placed reliance on the Court’s observa-
tions in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., U.P., Allahabad, (1963) Supp 1 SCR
885 at 899 (AIR 1963 SC 996 at p. 1003) and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2
SCC 602 : (AIR 1988 SC 1531), where the Court observed that though the
powers conferred on this Court under Article 142(1) are very wide, but in ex-
ercise of that power the Court cannot make any order plainly inconsistent
with the express statutory provisions of substantive law. It may be noticed
that in Prem Chand Garg’s and Antulay’s case (supra) observations with regard
to the extent of this Court’s power under Article 142(1) were made in the con-
text of fundamental rights. Those observations have no bearing on the ques-
tion in issue as there is no provision in any substantive law restricting this
Court’s power to quash proceedings pending before subordinate Court. This
Court’s power under Art. 142(1) to do “complete justice” is entirely of differ-
ent level and of a different quality. Any prohibition or restriction contained in
ordinary laws cannot act as a limitation on the constitutional power of this
Court. Once this Court has seisin of a cause or matter before it, it has power to
issue any order or direction to do “complete justice” in the matter. This con-
stitutional power of the Apex Court cannot be limited or restricted by provi-
sions contained in statutory law. In Harbans Singh v. U.P. State, (1982) 3 SCR
235 at p. 243 : (AIR 1982 SC 849 at p. 853), the Court observed :
“Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court for due and
proper administration of justice. Apart from this jurisdiction and
powers conferred on this Court under Articles 32 and 136 of the
Constitution I am of the opinion that this Court retains and must re-
tain, an inherent power and jurisdiction for dealing with any ex-
traordinary situation in the larger interests of administration of jus-
tice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. This power
must necessarily be sparingly used only in exceptional circum-
stances for furthering the ends of justice.”
No enactment made by Central or State Legislature can limit or restrict the
power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, though while exer-
cising power under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court must take into
consideration the statutory provisions regulating the matter in dispute. What
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