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A134 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 372

however, needs to be remembered that the powers conferred on the Court by
Article 142 being curative in nature cannot be construed as powers which au-
thorise the Court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant while dealing
with a cause pending before it. This power cannot be used to “supplant” sub-
stantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of the Court.
Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a
new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring expression statutory pro-
visions dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly
which cannot be achieved directly. Punishing a contemner advocate, while
dealing with a contempt of Court case by suspending his licence to practice, a
power otherwise statutorily available only to the Bar Council of India, on the
ground that the contemner is also an advocate, is, therefore, not permissible
in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The construction of Article
142 must be functionally informed by the salutary purposes of the Article viz.
to do complete justice between the parties. It cannot be otherwise. As already
noticed in a case of contempt of Court, the contemner and the Court cannot
be said to be litigating parties.
45. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has
the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice “be-
tween the parties in any cause or matter pending before it.” The very nature
of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exer-
cise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision
governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the con-
flicting claims of the litigating parties by “ironing out the creases” in a cause
or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a Court of restricted jurisdiction of
only dispute settling. It is well recognised and established that this Court has
always been a law maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute settling.
It is a problem solver in the nebulous areas”. [See K. Verraswami v. Union of
India, (1991) 3 SCC 655] but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with
the subject-matter of a given case, cannot be altogether ignored by this Court,
while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers
cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same
time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may
come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a stat-
ute dealing expressly with the subject.
47. Dealing with the powers of this Court under Article 142, in Prem Chand
Garg v. Excise Commr., U.P., Allahabad, 1963 Supp (1) SCR 885 : (AIR 1963 SC
996) it was said by the Constitution Bench (Paras 13 and 14 of AIR) :
“In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out that the wide
powers which are given to this Court for doing complete justice be-
tween the parties, can be used by this Court for instance, in adding
parties to the proceedings pending before it, or in admitting addi-
tional evidence, or in remanding the case, or in allowing a new
point to be taken for the first time. It is plain that in exercise these
and similar other powers, this Court would not be bound by the
relevant provisions of procedure if it is satisfied that a departure
from the said procedure is necessary to do complete justice between
the parties.”
[Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and Another - AIR 1998 SC
1895]
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