Page 159 - ELT_1st June 2020_VOL 372_Part 5th

2020 ] INFRA DREDGE SERVICES PVT. LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA 693

for period ranging from four months to 10 months, judgments were held to
be bad in law and set aside. It has been held time and again that justice
should not only be done but should appear to have been done and that jus-
tice delayed is justice denied. Justice withheld is even worse than that. The
Apex Court in the case of Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharash-
tra, 1978 (3) SCC 544 had an occasion to take serious note of the prejudice
normally caused to the litigant due to delayed delivery or pronouncement
of the judgment for the reasons which are not attributable either to the liti-
gant or to the State or to the legal profession.
13. In R.C. Shama v. Union of India, 1976 (3) SCC 474, the Apex Court after
noticing absence of the provision in the Code of Civil Procedure in the mat-
ter of time frame in delivery of judgment, observed as under :
“Nevertheless, we think that unreasonable delay between hearing
of arguments and delivery of a judgment, unless explained by ex-
ceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable
even where written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that
some points which the litigant considers important may have es-
caped notice. But, what is more important is that litigants must
have complete confidence in the results of litigation. This confi-
dence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing
of arguments and delivery of judgments. Justice, as we have often
observed, must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be
done.”
14. Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, 2002
(3) BCR (SC) 360 : 2001 (7) SCC 318 has also reconsidered the serious issue
of delayed delivery of judgment by some of the High Courts and laid down
certain guidelines in the matter of pronouncement of judgments by the
High Courts.
15. In the case of Devang Rasiklal Vora v. Union of India, 2003 (158) E.L.T. 30
(Bom.) = 2004 (3) BCR 450, the Division Bench of this Court to which one of
us is a party (Daga, J.) had an occasion to issue directions to the President of
the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai to
frame and lay down the guidelines on the similar lines as were laid down
by the Apex Court in the case of Anil Rai v. State of Bihar (supra) and to is-
sue appropriate administrative directions to all the Benches of the said Tri-
bunal. The similar guidelines can conveniently be laid down for the courts,
tribunals and quasi-judicial authorities prescribed under the Income-tax
Act, 1961 (“Act” for short) so as to prevent delayed delivery of the judg-
ment and/or order which at the end of the day results in denial of justice as
happened in the instant case.”
This decision was rendered in the context of the order passed by Appellate Tri-
bunal. Thereafter the Division Bench in the case of EMCO Ltd. extended the prin-
cipal order of the Additional Commissioner adjudicating or the original authori-
ty. The Division Bench observed thus :-
“5. We have heard the Learned Counsel for the Parties. In the present
case, the personal hearing was concluded on 17 September, 2012 and the
written submissions were filed by the Petitioner on 24 September, 2012. The
impugned order was passed on 31 July, 2013 i.e. almost nine months after
the hearing. This delay has resulted in the Petitioner’s submissions of goods
being returned within 180 days not being considered. This evidence was
sought to be brought on record before the Tribunal but not allowed. How-
EXCISE LAW TIMES  1st June 2020  159