Page 160 - ELT_1st June 2020_VOL 372_Part 5th

694 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 372

ever, this Court by its order dated 14 September, 2010, while remanding the
matter to the Adjudicating Authority, had left all issues open. Therefore,
the above evidence, which was available before the Adjudicating Authority
and also relied upon by the Petitioner at the time of hearing, was not con-
sidered in the impugned order, then the same can only be attributed to the
delay in passing the order. This delay does appear to have causesd preju-
dice to the Petitioner. This Court in the matter of Shivsagar Veg. Restaurant
(supra) has, after considering the various decisions of the Apex Court, laid
down that undue delay (four months) in delivery of judgment by the ITAT
after the hearing is in itself sufficient to set aside the impugned order with-
out considering the merits of the order. The Apex Court in the matter of An-
il Rai (supra) has reiterated the observations made by an earlier Bench of
Apex Court in R.C. Sharma v. Union of India [(1976) 3-SCC-574], which reads
as under :
“.....Nevertheless an unreasonable delay between hearing of argu-
ments and delivery of judgment, unless explained by exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when writ-
ten arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points
which the litigant considers important may have escaped notice.
But, what is more important is that litigants must have complete
confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence tends to be
shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments
and delivery of judgments.” (emphasis supplied)
6. In view of the above, it is very clear that the authorities under the Act
are obliged to dispose of proceedings before them as expeditiously as pos-
sible after the conclusion of the hearing. This alone would ensure that all
the submissions made by a party are considered in the order passed and
ensure that the litigant also has a satisfaction of noting that all his submis-
sions have been considered and an appropriate order has been passed. It is
most important that the litigant must have complete confidence in the pro-
cess of litigation and that this confidence would be shaken if there is exces-
sive delay between the conclusion of the hearing and delivery of judgment.
7. Therefore, in this case, we find that the delay by the Adjudicating Au-
thority in rendering its order nine months after the conclusion of the hear-
ing has caused prejudice to the Petitioner as it has not considered the evi-
dence produced in respect of return of goods within 180 days.
8. We have not relegated the Petitioner to the alternate remedy of filing an
appeal under the Act, as we find that the impugned order is against the pa-
rameters laid down by this Court in Shivsagar Veg. Restaurant (supra).
9. In the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside the impugned order dated
31 July, 2013 and direct the Additional Commissioner of Central Excise and
Customs to pass a fresh order after granting the Petitioner an opportunity
of personal hearing. Needless to add that the resultant adjudication order
would be passed within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the hear-
ing granted to the Petitioner.
Basis of these two decisions is not the delay alone but the resultant prejudice dis-
cernable from omissions and need to inculcate discipline.
9. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner points out various errors to
impugned order which likely to have resulted from the delay in passing order.
He states that the criteria for imposing liability on the petitioner has been adopt-
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