Page 155 - ELT_1st July 2020_Vol 373_Part 1

2020 ]ASSTT. DIR., DTE. OF ENFORCEMENT, NEW DELHI v. OMAR ALI OBAID BALSHARAF 65

22. To strengthen his arguments, Learned Counsel for applicant has
placed reliance on decision of Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy : 1998 (7) SCC 123 = 2008 (228) E.L.T. 162 (S.C.), wherein the Apex
Court explained the scope of limitation and condonation of delay, observing as
under :-
“The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the
parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for ap-
proaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of
such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation
are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties
do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object
of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of le-
gal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the
redress of the legal injury so suffered. ..The law of limitation is thus found-
ed on public policy...” (emphasis added)
23. Learned Counsel further relied upon judgment passed in the case of
State of Nagaland v. Lipokao : 2005 (3) SCC 752 = 2005 (183) E.L.T. 337 (S.C.) where-
in the Supreme Court has observed in para 9 of the judgment as under :
“What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause,
and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account
in using the discretion” (emphasis added)
24. Learned Counsel also relied upon judgment passed in the case of
Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji : 167 ITR 471 (SC) = 1987 (28) E.L.T. 185
(S.C.), whereby the Supreme Court has inter alia held that where the defaulting
party is the Government/State, the doctrine of equality before law demands that
all litigants, including the State/Government as a litigant, are accorded the same
treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no
warrant for according harsher treatment when the State is the applicant praying
for condonation of delay. On the contrary, on account of the fact that the State
represents the collective cause of the community, public interest would be better
served if the Courts apply the legal principles as elucidated hereinabove, in the
course of interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause” as provided in Sec-
tion 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
25. It is not in dispute that impugned order is dated 29-8-2019 and
same was pronounced in open Court and Mr. D.P. Singh, Counsel for applicant
herein was present there at that time. However, certified copy of the same was
received on 11-9-2019, whereas present appeal is filed on 22-1-2020 vide diary
No. 60434/2020.
26. Accordingly, on the other hand, Mr. Bishwajit Bhattacharya,
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 submits that
captioned appeal which is filed on 22-1-2020 is time-barred under Section 42 of
PMLA, 2002 which reads as under :
“Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal
may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of
communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on
any question of law or fact arising out of such order :
Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period,
allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.

EXCISE LAW TIMES  1st July 2020  155