Page 156 - ELT_1st July 2020_Vol 373_Part 1

66 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 373

Explanation. — For the purposes of this section, “High Court” means -
(i) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved
party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally
works for gain; and
(ii) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the
High Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or
in a case where there are more than one respondent, any of the
respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or per-
sonally works for gain. “
27. He further submits that delay of 80 days, in this case, beyond statu-
tory period (60 days) prescribed under Section 42 of PMLA, 2002 with a manda-
tory or pre-emptory negative language (like “not exceeding”, “not thereafter”)
cannot be condoned by Courts.
28. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that present appeal was
taken up on 23-1-2020 and thereafter, dubious application being CRL. M.A. No.
3338/2020 was filed by the applicant in the captioned appeal. Prayer thereto is to
treat another purported appeal filed purportedly on 24-12-2019 (vide diary No.
1621374/2019), purportedly returned (date not mentioned) after the winter
break, however, not filed thereafter, which amounts to seeking permission to
perpetrate dubious act. Alternative dubious prayer is to wilfully disobey the law
declared by the Supreme Court of India.
29. Reliance is placed on decision in Union of India v. Popular Construc-
tion Co. : (2001) 8 SCC 470, whereby held as under :
“12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the
crucial words are ‘but not thereafter’ used in the proviso to sub-section (3).
In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within
the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar
the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go fur-
ther. To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside the
Award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the
phrase ‘but not thereafter’ wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation
would justify such a result.”
30. In case of Bengal Chemists and Druggists Association v. Kalyan
Chowdhury : (2018) 3 SCC 41, the Supreme Court has held as under :
“12. One further thing remains and that is that Learned Counsel for the
Appellant pointed out the difference between the expression used in the
Arbitration Act as construed by Popular Construction (supra) and its absence
in the proviso in Section 421(3). For the reasons given above, we are of the
view that this would also make no difference in view of the language of the
proviso to Section 421(3) which contains mandatory or peremptory nega-
tive language and speaks of a second period not exceeding 45 days, which
would have the same effect as the expression “but not thereafter” used in
Section 34(3) proviso of the Arbitration Act, 1996.”
31. In case of P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar : (2019) 13 SCC 445, the Su-
preme Court held as under :
“35. This Court in Popular Construction case followed the same approach
when it relied on the phrase “but not thereafter” to hold that Section 5 of
the Limitation Act was expressly excluded”: (SCC pp. 474-75, para 12)
“12. One further thing remains and that is that Learned Counsel
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