Page 146 - ELT_1st August 2020_Vol 373_Part 3

328 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 373

requiring the said Customs Broker to submit within thirty days to such deputy or
assistant commissioner of Customs, nominated by the principal commissioner or
commissioner, as the case may be, a written statement of defence and also to
specify therein as to whether the Customs Broker desires to be heard in person.
15. Mr. Saraf contended that the challenge to the revocation proceed-
ings having been initiated without jurisdiction, is based on a proper construction
of such sub-regulation. Referring to the order confirming suspension dated May
31, 2016, it was pointed out that the offence report was received admittedly by
the first respondent on April 19, 2016 and the impugned show cause notice dated
July 18, 2016 was dispatched on July 20, 2016, which is beyond the period pre-
scribed by sub-regulation (1).
16. Inviting the attention of the Bench to the supplementary affidavit
filed by the petitioners, Mr. Saraf contended that the show cause notice dated
July 18, 2016 was received by the petitioners on July 21, 2016. It has been his con-
tention that the show cause notice having been dispatched beyond ninety days
from the date of receipt of offence report on April 19, 2016, the first respondent
ceased to have the jurisdiction to initiate revocation proceedings.
17. For the proposition that proceedings are required to be initiated
within ninety days from the date of receipt of offence report failing which the
proceedings would be non est, Mr. Saraf placed reliance on three decisions of the
Madras High Court reported in (i) 2014 (309) E.L.T. 433 (Mad.) [A.M. Ahamed &
Co. v. Commissioner of Customs (Imports), Chennai], (ii) 2016 (332) E.L.T. 300 (Mad.)
[Masterstroke Freight Forwarders P. Ltd. v. C.C. (I) Chennai-I, and (iii) 2016 (334)
E.L.T. 289 (Mad.) [Saro International Freight System v. Commr. of Cus., Chennai-
VIII]. According to him, all these decisions relate to action taken under the 2004
Regulations or the 2016 Regulations and have a direct bearing on the point raised
by the petitioners. In all such decisions proceedings for revocation of license not
having been initiated within ninety days were set aside, and he has accordingly
prayed for similar relief.
18. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Saraf on Division Bench decisions
of this Court reported in (i) 1997 (91) E.L.T. 51 (Cal.) [Union of India v. Kanti
Tarafdar] and (ii) 1999 (113) E.L.T. 57 (Cal.) [Rajesh Kumar Jain v. Union of India],
on the procedure for effecting service of notice to show cause on the noticee hav-
ing regard to the provisions of section 153 of the Customs Act, 1962.
19. Relying on a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 2006
(3) CHN 655 [Md. Yeasin v. State of West Bengal], Mr. Saraf contended that should
the Bench be disinclined to interfere with the revocation proceedings, the order
of suspension ought to be set aside having regard to the fact that revocation pro-
ceedings were not initiated within ninety days of receipt of the offence report.
20. Answering the contentions raised by Mr. Saraf, Mr. Ganguly,
Learned Advocate for the respondents contended that absolutely no case for in-
terference has been set up by the petitioners. First, he objected to the maintaina-
bility of the writ petition before this Court on the ground of an appellate remedy
being available to the petitioners before the CESTAT against an order confirming
the suspension dated May 3, 2016. To rebut the contention of Mr. Saraf that the
CESTAT is not functional, cause lists of the CESTAT dated August 9 and 10, 2016
were produced by Mr. Ganguly to support his contention that the CESTAT is
functional.

EXCISE LAW TIMES  1st August 2020  146