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332 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 373

36. Although the first respondent may not have disclosed in the order
impugned why the decisions placed before him were not applicable, mere omis-
sion to do so cannot be held fatal. The reasons furnished by the first respondent
for confirming the order of suspension are sound and justify acceptance.
37. For the reasons aforesaid, this Bench answers the point by holding
that the action taken by the first respondent under Regulation 19 of the 2013
Regulations is unexceptionable and no interference is called for.
Point - (iii)
38. It is true, as contended by Mr. Ganguly, that interference at the
show cause stage should be few and far between and that the noticee ought to be
relegated to the authority issuing the notice to decide whatever objections the
noticee might have had. However, in a given case, where the High Court is satis-
fied that a show cause notice is totally non est in the eye of law for absolute want
of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, entertainment of a
writ petition in this behalf may not be imprudent. Since Mr. Saraf has alleged
that the first respondent did not have the jurisdiction to initiate recovery pro-
ceedings beyond the time specified in Regulation 20(1), this Bench proposes to
consider such contention next.
39. This point is, accordingly, answered by overruling the objection of
Mr. Ganguly.
Point - (iv)
40. The reported decisions of the Madras High Court cited by Mr. Saraf
do advance his cause. However, both on facts as well as in law, this Bench is per-
suaded to take a different view of the matter.
41. It is settled by a catena of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court,
while considering varying statutes, that when a public functionary is required by
a statute to do or perform a certain thing or activity within a specified time, the
same is ordinarily directory; however, if the consequence for inaction on the part
of the statutory authority within such specified time is expressly provided in the
statute, it must be held to be imperative. Reference may be made in this connec-
tion to the decisions reported in (2007) 8 SCC 705 (Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure
Industrial Coke & Chemicals Limited), (2006) 5 SCC 702 (Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. of
NCT of Delhi), (2005) 6 SCC 776 (Punjab State Electricity Board Ltd. v. Zora Singh),
(2003) 8 SCC 498 (P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir), (2003) 3 SCC 433 (Balwant Singh v.
Anand Kumar Sharma), (2003) 2 SCC 577 (Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal), (2003) 2
SCC 111 [Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.], (1984) 2 SCC 486
(Dalchand v. Municipal Corporation, Bhopal), and AIR 1968 SC 224 (Remington Rand
of India Ltd. v. Workmen).
42. A passage from the decision in Dalchand (supra) [the Bench com-
prised of one Learned Judge, at it appears from the report] is very instructive,
reading as follows :
“1. *** There are no ready tests or invariable formulae to determine whether
a provision is mandatory or directory. The broad purpose of the statute is
important. The object of the particular provision must be considered. The
link between the two is most important. The weighing of the consequence
of holding a provision to be mandatory or directory is vital and, more often
than not, determinative of the very question whether the provision is man-
datory or directory. Where the design of the statute is the avoidance or pre-

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