Page 156 - ELT_15th August 2020_Vol 373_Part 4

490 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 373

expressly mentioned, nor to authorise the Income Tax Officer to
commence proceedings which before the new Act came into force
had by the expiry of the period provided, become barred.”
10.2 To similar effect is the judgment in ITO v. Induprasad Devshanker Bhatt
[AIR 1969 SC 778]. The Court held : (AIR p. 783, para 6)
“6. In our opinion, the principle of this decision applies in the pre-
sent case and it must be held that on a proper construction of Sec-
tion 297(2)(d)(ii) of the new Act, the Income Tax Officer cannot is-
sue a notice under Section 148 in order to reopen the assessment of
an assessee in a case where the right to reopen the assessment was
barred under the old Act at the date when the new Act came into
force. It follows therefore that the notices dated 13-11-1963 and 9-1-
1964 issued by the Income Tax Officer, Ahmedabad were illegal and
ultra vires and were rightly quashed by the Gujarat High Court [In-
duprasad Devshanker Bhatt v. J.P. Jani, 1964 SCC OnLine Guj 18 :
(1965) 58 ITR 559] by the grant of a writ.”
10.3 In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840], this
Court said : (SCC p. 846, para 7)
“7. ... ’(2) ... The new law of limitation providing a longer peri-
od cannot revive a dead remedy. Nor can it suddenly extinguish
vested right of action by providing for a shorter period of limita-
tion.’”
10.4 Similarly in T. Kaliamurthi v. Five Gori Thaikkal Wakf [(2008) 9 SCC
306], this Court said : (SCC p. 322, para 40)
“40. In this background, let us now see whether this section has
any retrospective effect. It is well-settled that no statute shall be
construed to have a retrospective operation until its language is
such that would require such conclusion. The exception to this rule
is enactments dealing with procedure. This would mean that the
law of limitation, being a procedural law, is retrospective in opera-
tion in the sense that it will also apply to proceedings pending at
the time of the enactment as also to proceedings commenced there-
after, notwithstanding that the cause of action may have arisen be-
fore the new provisions came into force. However, it must be noted
that there is an important exception to this rule also. Where the
right of suit is barred under the law of limitation in force before the
new provision came into operation and a vested right has accrued
to another, the new provision cannot revive the barred right or take
away the accrued vested right.”
10.5 For the latest exposition of the same rule see Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd.
v. Union of India [(2011) 6 SCC 739 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 458] , SCC at para 29.
11. The effect of the amendment of Section 11-B on 12-5-2000 is that all
claims for rebate pending on this date would be governed by a period of
one year from the date of shipment and not six months. This, however, is
subject to the rider that the claim for rebate should not be made beyond the
original period of six months. On the facts of the present case, since the
claims for rebate were made beyond the original period of six months, the
respondents cannot avail of the extended period of one year on the subse-
quent amendment to Section 11B.
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