Page 212 - GSTL_2nd April 2020_Vol 35_Part 1

114 GST LAW TIMES [ Vol. 35
30. The decision of the Court in Mannuelsons Hotels (supra), also, is not
relevant to the present case. To better appreciate the findings of the Supreme
Court, it is necessary to understand the factual matrix giving rise to this case. In
this case, on 11-7-1986, a G.O. was issued which accepted the recommendations
of the Government of India, suggesting that tourism be declared as an “indus-
try”. Pursuant to the aforesaid G.O, the appellants began constructing a hotel
building which was completed in the year 1991. In line with the said G.O, Kerala
Building Tax Amendment Act, 1990 was passed w.e.f. from 6-11-1990 and Sec-
tion 3A was added, which granted the Government power by notification in the
gazette to make exemption from the payment of building tax under the Act.
However, no notification under Section 3A was issued. Notice for fling returns
under the Kerala Building Tax Act was issued to the appellants and this was con-
tested by the Appellants on the ground that they were under no obligation to
furnish any return under the said Act as they were exempt from the payment of
building tax as per the G.O and Section 3A. By letter dated 6-2-1997, the exemp-
tion promised by the G.O of 1986 was denied to the appellants stating that as
Section 3A had been omitted w.e.f. 1-3-1993, the power to grant exemption had
itself gone and, therefore, no such exemption could be given to the appellants.
Thus, the issue for consideration before the Court was that whether the appellant
was entitled to claim exemption from payment of property tax under the Kerala
Building Tax Act, 1975, as amended, as per Section 3A, on ground of promissory
estoppel. The said Section 3A came in force from 6-11-1990 and had been later
omitted w.e.f. 1-3-1993. The Court in this case noted in paragraph 36 as follows :
“36 ....This would make it clear that from 6-11-1990 to 1-3-1993, the power
to grant exemption from building tax was statutorily conferred by Section
3A on the Government. And we have seen that the Statement of Objects
and Reasons for introducing Section 3A expressly states that the said sec-
tion was introduced in order to fulfil one of the promises contained in the
G.O. dated 11-7-1986. We find that the appellants, having relied on the said
G.O. dated 11-7-1986, had, in fact, constructed a hotel building by 1991. It is
clear, therefore, that the non-issuance of a notification under Section 3A
was an arbitrary act of the Government which must be remedied by appli-
cation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as has been held by us here-
inabove. The ministerial act of non-issue of the notification cannot possibly
stand in the way of the appellants getting relief under the said doctrine for
it would be unconscionable on the part of the Government to get away
without fulfilling its promise. It is also an admitted fact that no other con-
sideration of overwhelming public interest exists in order that the Govern-
ment be justified in resiling from its promise. The relief that must, therefore,
be moulded on the facts of the present case is that for the period that Sec-
tion 3A was in force, no building tax is payable by the appellants. However,
for the period post-1-3-1993, no statutory provision for the grant of exemption be-
ing available, it is clear that no relief can be given to the appellants as the doctrine
of promissory estoppel must yield when it is found that it would be contrary to
statute to grant such relief…”
(emphasis supplied)
31. Thus, Mannuelson’s case (supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts
from the present case before us. Noticeably, in Mannuelson’s case (supra), the de-
cision was rendered on the issue of promissory estoppel against the action of the

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