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2020 ] HERO MOTOCORP. LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA 115
Government, i.e., an executive action, but, more importantly, this case also goes
against the Petitioner inasmuch as, the Supreme Court while granting the relief
of promissory estoppel was also mindful of the fact that in case where there is no
statutory provision for the grant of exemption, no relief can be given. In Para-
graph 36 of the judgment, the Court notes that no mandamus could be issued to
the legislature to amend the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975, for that would neces-
sarily involve the judiciary in transgressing into a forbidden field under the con-
stitutional scheme of separation of power.
32. Ergo, in view of the proviso to Section 174(2)(c) of the CGST Act,
the issue that arises for our consideration is whether the doctrine of promissory
estoppel can be invoked against a legislative act, because in the present case, the
government has clearly acted in accordance with the law laid down by the Par-
liament. When the law itself has undergone a complete revision, can the doctrine
of promissory estoppel still be invoked, in light of Section 174(2)(c) of the CGST
Act? The issue that arises in the present petition has been firmly established in a
string of judgments and is no longer a point which is untouched by dictum.
33. We may in this connection refer to the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. and Ors. v. State of U.P and Ors.,
(2011) 3 SCC 193. The facts of this case were that a new Industrial Policy dated
30-4-1990 was declared by the State Government assuring the grant of 33.33% hill
development rebate on the total amount of electricity bills to new entrepreneurs
for a period of 5 years. This period was extended by another period of 5 years to
be made available to new industrial units set up till 31-3-1997. Vide Notifications
dated 18-6-1998 and 25-1-1999, uniform tariffs of electricity were introduced
whereby the rebate so given was reduced to 17%. Post 2000, vide a Notification
dated 7-8-2000, a new tariff was announced which completely withdrew the hill
development rebate. A challenge to the aforesaid notifications was turned down
by the two judge bench of the Supreme Court in U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Sant
Steels and Alloys (P) Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 777, which took a very restrictive view of
Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948, stating that any notification is-
sued thereunder can only be revoked or modified if express provision was made
for such revocation under Section 49 itself. Further, such revocation could take
place under the General Clauses Act only if such withdrawal was in larger public
interest, or if legislation was enacted by the legislature authorising the Govern-
ment to withdraw the benefit granted by the notification. The matter was re-
ferred to the larger three judge bench in Shree Sidhbali Steels (supra) which over-
ruled Sant Steels case (supra), stating that its interpretation of Section 49 of the
Electricity Supply Act was plainly incorrect, and that Sections 14 and 21 of the
General Clauses Act made it clear that power under the said sections can be ex-
ercised from time to time and carries with it the power to withdraw, modify,
amend or cancel the notifications earlier issued. Thus, while deciding the case,
one of the questions that fell for consideration before the three judge Bench of the
Supreme Court was whether a benefit given by a statutory notification can be
withdrawn by the Government by another statutory notification under a differ-
ent statute and whether the principle of promissory estoppel would be applica-
ble to exercise of statutory powers. The Court observed as under :
“31. It is an admitted position that the Notification dated 28-6-1996, grant-
ing rebate to the industries set up in hill areas, was issued in exercise of
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