Page 99 - GSTL_14th May 2020_Vol 36_Part 2
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2020 ] AMAZONITE STEEL PVT. LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA 201
davits, but on the legal principles of interpretation of fiscal statutes and examina-
tion of the precedents cited by parties. Upon hearing both the parties on the third
issue, the Court is of the opinion that the powers conferred under Section 83 are
drastic and extraordinary in nature. The Court also believes that the powers un-
der this section should not be invoked routinely and must be exercised with due
caution, circumspection and deliberation. The judgments relied on by the
Learned Counsel for petitioners in Valerius Industries (supra) and Pranit Hem
Desai (supra) can be distinguished on the grounds that they only highlight the
rationale and nature of the powers conferred under Section 83. These judgments
do not deliberate upon the point of fresh issue of an order for provisional at-
tachment which is of principal relevance to this case. The judgments relied by the
Learned Counsel for respondents, that is, Shrimati Priti (supra) and Kaithal Timber
Pvt. Ltd. (supra) interprets a similar provision of provisional attachment in the
Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003. The Court in both cases while dealing with a
provision that is pari materia to the present Section 83, has categorically held that
fresh order for provisional attachment can be issued after the expiry of the time
as prescribed under the Act.
29. Mr. Chakraborty Learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners re-
lied on the Delhi High Court judgment in VLS Finance Limited (supra) to support
the argument that extending the time of provisional attachment after a certain
period of time as prescribed in the statute is not permissible. The Court while
appreciating this finding, would also like to note another observation of the Del-
hi High Court wherein it has categorically mentioned that they have not consid-
ered and examined whether the Revenue can pass a fresh order under Section
281B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In my view this observation is pertinent to the
issue in hand. The relevant extract has been cited below :
“15. We wish to further clarify as a matter of abundant caution and state
that we have not considered and examined whether the Revenue can pass a
fresh order under Section 28IB in view of the third proviso to the said Sec-
tion introduced/inserted by Finance (No. 2) Act of 2009 with retrospective
effect from 1st April, 1988. If required, the said issue and question will be
examined in case the Revenue passes any such order. We have not barred
or prohibited the Revenue from passing any such order or expressed any
opinion whether any such order should be or could be passed. These as-
pects can be examined by the respondents. It will be premature to decide
these contentions now. We do not want to express any opinion in vacuum
on the assumption that an order may be passed. This caveat is necessary
least there be any confusion……..”
30. Mr. Chakraborty further relied on Shrimati Majjo (supra), Electro Za-
vod (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) & Sukhpal Singh (supra) to contend that extension of
provisional attachment beyond the time-period prescribed is not permitted by
the statute. It is to be noted that Section 83 of the CGST Act, 2017 does not have a
provision for extension of an order for provisional attachment. The contention in
hand is with respect to issue of fresh order of provisional attachment and not
extension of the same. On this note, the case laws referred to by the Learned
Counsel shall not be applicable to the issue in hand.
31. One need not join issue with regard to the judgments cited by the
petitioner with respect to interpretation of fiscal statutes, as I am firmly of the
view that Section 83 has to be construed literally and strictly. On a perusal of Sec-
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