Page 72 - GSTL_21st May 2020_Vol 36_Part 3

318 GST LAW TIMES [ Vol. 36
The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in
Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. (1919 AC 368) and has been reaf-
firmed by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v.
Gordon Grant & Co. Ltd. (1935 AC 532) and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.
(AIR 1940 PC 105). It has also been held to be equally applicable to en-
forcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The
High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in
limine.”
(emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors. [(1997) 5 SCC 536 = 1997 (89) E.L.T. 247 (S.C.)], this Court went on to observe
that an Act cannot bar and curtail remedy under Article 226 or 32 of the Consti-
tution. The Court, however, added a word of caution and expounded that the
constitutional Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested
in the provisions of the Act and would exercise its jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of the enactment. To put it differently, the fact that the High Court has
wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not mean that it can
disregard the substantive provisions of a statute and pass orders which can be
settled only through a mechanism prescribed by the statute.
12. Indubitably, the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution are wide, but certainly not wider than the plenary powers bestowed
on this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Article 142 is a conglomera-
tion and repository of the entire judicial powers under the Constitution, to do
complete justice to the parties. Even while exercising that power, this Court is
required to bear in mind the legislative intent and not to render the statutory
provision otiose. In a recent decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Oil
and Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation
Limited & Ors. [(2017) 5 SCC 42], the statutory appeal filed before this Court was
barred by 71 days and the maximum time limit for condoning the delay in terms
of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 was only 60 days. In other words, the
appeal was presented beyond the condonable period of 60 days. As a result, this
Court could not have condoned the delay of 71 days. Notably, while admitting
the appeal, the Court had condoned the delay in filing the appeal. However, at
the final hearing of the appeal, an objection regarding appeal being barred by
limitation was allowed to be raised being a jurisdictional issue and while dealing
with the said objection, the Court referred to the decisions in Singh Enterprises v.
Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur & Ors. [(2008) 3 SCC 70 = 2008 (221)
E.L.T. 163 (S.C.)], Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private
Limited & Anr. [(2009) 5 SCC 791 = 2009 (236) E.L.T. 417 (S.C.)], Chhattisgarh State
Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors. [(2010) 5 SCC
23] and Suryachakra Power Corporation Limited v. Electricity Department represent-
ed by its Superintending Engineer, Port Blair & Ors. [(2016) 16 SCC 152] and con-
cluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the Court
for maintaining an appeal beyond maximum prescribed period in Section 125 of
the Electricity Act.
13. The principle underlying the dictum in this decision would apply
proprio vigore to Section 31 of the 2005 Act including to the powers of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Notably, in this decision, a submis-
sion was canvassed by the assessee that in the peculiar facts of that case (as urged
in the present case), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of
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