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2020 ] ASSTT. COMMR. (CT), LTU v. GLAXO SMITH KLINE CONSUMER HEALTH CARE 321
15. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal that the Constitution
Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, has
ruled that there is no conflict of opinion in Antulay case [A.R. Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602] or in Union Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide
Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584] with the principle set down in
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996. Be it noted, when
there is a statutory command by the legislation as regards limitation and
there is the postulate that delay can be condoned for a further period not
exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined,
fundamental, general issues of public policy as has been held in Union
Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC
584], As the pronouncement in Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regula-
tory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23, lays down quite clearly that the policy be-
hind the Act emphasising on the constitution of a special adjudicatory fo-
rum, is meant to expeditiously decide the grievances of a person who may
be aggrieved by an order of the adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate
Commission. The Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to
the limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to be followed
regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a different way, the
prescription of limitation in a case of present nature, when the statute
commands that this Court may condone the further delay not beyond 60
days, it would come within the ambit and sweep of the provisions and
policy of legislation. It is equivalent to Section 3 of the Limitation Act.
Therefore, it is uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse
to Article 142 of the Constitution.
16. We had stated earlier that we will be adverting to the passage in
Suryachakra Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Electricity Deptt., (2016) 16 SCC 152. There,
the Court had referred to Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It fundamentally
relied on M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58, wherein the Court after
referring to certain authorities, analysed thus : (M.P. Steel Corpn. Case), SCC
p. 91, para 43)
“43. ... when a certain period is excluded by applying the principles
contained in Section 14, there is no delay to be attributed to the appel-
lant and the limitation period provided by the statute concerned con-
tinues to be the stated period and not more than the stated period.
We conclude, therefore, that the principle of Section 14 which is a
principle based on advancing the cause of justice would certainly ap-
ply to exclude time taken in prosecuting proceedings which are bona
fide and with due diligence pursued, which ultimately end without a
decision on the merits of the case.” ”
(emphasis in italics - in original, and in bold - supplied)
Similarly, in State v. Mushtaq Ahmad & Ors. [(2016) 1 SCC 315], this Court opined
that where minimum sentence is provided for an offence then no Court can im-
pose lesser punishment on ground of mitigating factors.
14. A priori, we have no hesitation in taking the view that what this
Court cannot do in exercise of its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Consti-
tution, it is unfathomable as to how the High Court can take a different approach
in the matter in reference to Article 226 of the Constitution. The principle under-
lying the rejection of such argument by this Court would apply on all fours to the
exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
15. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pra-
desh High Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), which had adopt-
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