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means the offences specified under Parts A, B and C of the Schedule subject to
prescribed monetary limit in case of Part B. The scheme of the Act clearly shows
that, Money Laundering, though an offence by itself, is inextricably connected to
a scheduled offences (predicate offences). The schedule discloses that the predi-
cate offences cover a variety of statutes.
11. Under the Act, all offences punishable under Section 4 of the Act
shall be tried by special courts constituted under Section 43 of the Act by the
Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the concerned High
Court. Section 43(2) of the Act provides that, while trying an offence under the
Act, a Special Court shall also try an offence, other than an offence referred to in
sub-section (1), with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, 1973, be charged at the same trial. Identical provision is also available un-
der Section 4(3) of the PC Act.
12. Essentially the scheme of the Act, indicates that the offence under
the Money Laundering Act is to be tried by the special courts constituted under
that Act and the predicate offences are to be tried by the Court competent under
the Statute, which had made the predicate offence punishable. The offences un-
der the Money Laundering Act, are to be investigated by the competent authori-
ties under the concerned statute and tried by the Court competent under that
Act. Since the sine quo non for a prosecution of an offence under the Money
Laundering Act is the existence of proceeds of a predicate offence, it can be said
that, conviction of an offence under the Money Laundering Act depends on the
establishment of predicate offence and the generation of proceeds of that crime.
13. Evidently, Money Laundering Act does not contemplate that of-
fence under the Money Laundering Act and the predicate offence shall both be
tried by the same Special Court under the Money Laundering Act. There is no
specific provision in the Money Laundering Act, which prescribes so. In fact, ex-
istence of Section 44(1)(c) visualizes the existence of two separate proceedings
before two courts, one being the Special Court under the Money Laundering Act.
In such a situation, Section 44(1)(c) confers an authority on the authorized officer
under the Money Laundering Act to make an application requesting the Court to
commit the case relating to predicate offence to the Special Court. It clearly
shows that, unless such an application is made, the predicate offence shall be
continued in the court competent under the Act.
14. The short question that now arises in this case is whether, it is ob-
ligatory on the part of the competent officer to seek a committal of the predicate
offence in every case and even if such an option is available to the officer and if
in exercise of such option, an application is filed, is the Court, as a matter of
course, bound to allow it.
15. It is clear that Parliament did not intend to make it obligatory on the
authorized officer under the Money Laundering Act, to invariably make an ap-
plication under Section 44(1)(c) of the Act. Otherwise, there is no reason as to
why the committal under Section 44(1)(c) should be dependent on an application
by the competent officer under the Money Laundering Act. The Parliament could
not have been oblivious of the fact that at least in some cases, the predicate of-
fences may be triable by special courts authorized for the specific purpose and
that the Special Court under the Money Laundering Act may not be competent to
try such offences, as has happened in this case.
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