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2020 ] INSPECTOR OF POLICE, CBI/SCB v. ASSTT. DIR., DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT 215

16. The contention of Mr. Shaijan C. George, the Special Public Prosecu-
tor for the authority under the Money Laundering Act, was that, in the light of
Section 71 of the Act, which confers an overriding effect over all other Statutes
and Section 44(1) which overrides Code of Criminal Procedure, both provisions
have to be read in conjunction and Money Laundering Act will have primacy
over all other proceedings. The significant words used in Section 44(1) of the Act
are, “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure” (em-
phasis supplied). It is explicit that, the non obstante clause refers to the procedural
matters in relation to matters covered by Section 44 and not the substantive law.
However, Section 46 of the Act makes provisions of Cr.P.C applicable to proceed-
ings before the Special Court. Since the non obstante clause in Section 44(1) ap-
plies only to the procedural matters, that provision cannot support the conten-
tion that Section 44(1) overrides the substantive law in relation to Statutes cover-
ing the predicate offence.
17. Section 71 of the Money Laundering Act envisages an overriding ef-
fect. It reads as follows :
“71 - Act to have overriding effect. - The provisions of this Act shall have
effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any
other law for the time being in force.”
Section 71 itself clarifies that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwith-
standing anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. Evidently,
the Money Laundering Act has primacy in the field of operation to which the Act
extends and within that domain, it will have overriding effect over any other in-
consistent provisions in other Statutes. This is the natural and the limited extent
of the scope of Section 71 and not an omnibus overriding effect over all other
Statutes, as argued by the respondent. This has been consistently laid down by
various authorities. The Company Law Appellate Tribunal, in Anil Goel v. Ra-
manjit, Deputy Director in CP(IB) 70/ALD/2017, resolving the dispute as to
whether Money Laundering Act has supremacy over Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code held that both statutes provide two different hierarchies of functionaries to
decide the controversies that arise under respective authorities. When such is the
case, one authority cannot interfere with the function of the other authority un-
der a different enactment. In Varrsana Ispat Ltd. v. Deputy Director (Company ap-
peal 493/2018), CLAT rejected the contention that provisions of Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code override provisions of Money-laundering Act, 2002 and held
that, as both relate to different field of operation, both can proceed simultaneous-
ly and one Act has no overriding effect over the other. This view was reiterated
by NCLAT in Rotomac Global Private Ltd. v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforce-
ment (Company Appeal) (AT) (Insolvency No. 140/2019).
18. Referring to the main issue involved in Section 44(1)(c) of the Act,
the Learned Special Prosecutor referred to the decision of Jharkhand High Court
in Anosh Ekka v. Enforcement Directorate [W.P (Cr.). No. 257 of 2012], though the
Learned Prosecutor did not fully endorse the observations therein. In the above
case, crime was registered by the State Vigilance against a former Chief Minister
for offences punishable under Sections 420, 423, 424, 465 r/w 120B of IPC and
other provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In the course of investiga-
tion, Enforcement Directorate initiated proceedings under the Money Launder-
ing Act on an allegation that ill-gotten money was used for purchasing land and
other assets. The question that came up for consideration before the High Court
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