Page 173 - ELT_2nd_15th April 2020_Vol 372_Part

2020 ] INSPECTOR OF POLICE, CBI/SCB v. ASSTT. DIR., DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT 219

tion 44(1)(a) provides that, it is the Court constituted for the area in which the
offence has been committed. This seems to be the only reasonable, logical and
sensible interpretation to Section 44(1)(a).
29. This leads to the interpretation on the scope of Section 44(1)(c),
which confers a choice on the authorized officer under PMLA to seek committal
of case relating to scheduled offence to special court. It cannot be said that the
Legislature is oblivious of incongruous and absurd situation that may arise if it is
provided that scheduled offences shall simultaneously be tried by the special
court under Money Laundering Act. As referred earlier, it may be possible that
scheduled offences can be tried only by notified or designated courts, which
power, cannot be exercised by the special court under the Money Laundering
Act. If such a case is committed to a special court under the PMLA, invoking Sec-
tion 44(1)(c), the special court will be without jurisdiction to try that case. Neces-
sarily the trial has to fail. Consequently, the prosecution under Money Launder-
ing Act should also fail. Statute cannot be interpreted to lead to such incongru-
ous situation. As referred in Anosh Ekka’s case, in such situation, the interpreta-
tive tool of “reductioad absurdness” which means that, whichever procedure under
the scheme of Act would appear as absurd is to be discarded and only that pro-
cedure which would fulfill the aim and object of the Act is to be adopted. Section
44(1)(c) cannot be interpreted to authorize the Court to commit a case relating to
scheduled offence to an incompetent court and thereby defeat the purpose of
Act. Section 44(1)(c) also cannot be interpreted to authorize a court to commit a
case pending before it to a court which lacks jurisdiction and to confer jurisdic-
tion on a Court which inherently lacks it.
30. Hence, Section 44(1)(c) should receive a reasonable interpretation
which will augment the purpose of Act. Necessarily, it has to held that, Section
44(1)(c) does not imply that, in every case contemplated under that sub-section,
the competent authority shall make application for committal of case relating to
scheduled offence to a special court under the Money Laundering Act. The au-
thorized officer competent to lay the complaint is vested with a solemn discre-
tion to carefully apply his mind and only in appropriate cases where the commit-
tal to special court will not defeat the prosecution and on the other hand, will
enable a speedy disposal of case and achieve purpose of Statute should file an
application. Likewise the terms “it shall” found in Section 44(1)(c) following the
words “under sub-clause (b)” does not make it mandatory on Court to allow
every application, without due application of mind and de hors the merits of the
case. The above words have to be interpreted to mandatorily authorize the court
to commit case pending before it to a special court under the Money Laundering
Act, if valid grounds are made by the authorized authority.
31. A detailed discussion as above lead to a conclusion that, if the
Court which has taken cognizance of scheduled offence is other than the special
court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of offence of money-
laundering, the competent authority under the Money Laundering Act to file a
complaint, is given a discretion to make application under Section 44(1)(c) in ap-
propriate cases, in the interest of justice and for a speedy trial. The Court also has
to duly apply its mind and take a proper decision in accordance with law. In oth-
er cases, as held in Anosh Ekka’s case (supra), the special court trying offence un-
der the Money Laundering Act will have to wait for the result of trial relating to
scheduled offence.
EXCISE LAW TIMES  15th April 2020  189