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290 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 372

in or in relation to the manufacture of which no process has been carried on with
the aid of ‘power’ or of ‘steam’ would attract ‘nil’ rate of Excise Duty, but accord-
ing to the Department since the process has been carried out by the Appellant
after January, 2002 with the aid of ‘power’, it would fall under sub-heading No.
3401.19 and, therefore, would be subject to 20% Excise levy. With effect from 28
February, 2005, soap, in or in relation to the manufacture of which, no process
has been carried on with the aid of person or of steam for heating would attract
16% Central Excise Duty, but, in view of the Notification dated 24 February,
2005, it would be exempted from payment of Excise Duty. It has, therefore, to be
determined whether in the manufacture or in relation to the manufacture of
soap, any process has been carried on with the aid of power or of steam.
30. The expression, ‘power’ has neither been defined in the Tariff Act
or in the Notifications or the Act. The Department seeks to rely upon the defini-
tion of ‘power’ under the Factories Act and the dictionaries. According to the
Appellant, neither of these two can be resorted.
31. What has, therefore, first to be examined is whether the definition
of ‘power’ defined in the Factories Act can be taken aid of while understanding
the meaning of ‘power’ in the Tariff Act and the Notifications.
32. The Commissioner has relied upon the definition of the expression
as contended in Section 2(g) of the Factories Act. The Supreme Court in MSCO
Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Others [1985 (19) E.L.T. 15 (S.C.)] observed that
while construing a word which occurs in a statute or a statutory instrument it
must, in the absence of any definition in that very document, be given the same
meaning which it receives in ordinary parlance or is understood in the sense in
which people conversant with the subject matter of the statue or statutory in-
strument understand it and that it would be hazardous to interpret a word in
accordance with its definition in another statute or statutory instrument, more so
when such statute or statutory instrument is not dealing with any cognate
subject.
33. The definition of ‘power’ as contended in the Factories Act, in our
considered opinion, cannot be taken aid of to determine the meaning of the ex-
pression ‘power’ under the Tariff Act or the Exemption Notification as the pur-
pose of defining ‘power’ under the Factories Act is for an entirely different pur-
pose and that the Finance Act does not deal with cognate subjects. That meaning
of the expression ‘power’ has to be adopted which people understand in com-
mercial sense. The objective of providing no levy of duty or granting exemption
is to discourage manufacturers of soaps by taking aid of ‘electricity’ or of ‘steam’
for heating.
34. The Commissioner relied upon a decision of the Karnataka High
Court in Employees State Insurance Corporation for taking a view that the definition
of the ‘power’ in the Factories Act can be taken aid of to give a meaning to the
expression ‘power’ in the Tariff Act and the Exemption Notification. The Karna-
taka High Court observed that the respondent was admittedly carrying on man-
ufacture activity of ‘sweetmeat’ with the aid of ‘gas’ and it was common
knowledge that normally ‘electricity’ is not used for manufacture of sweets but
‘gas’ is commonly used. It is in this context that the contention of the Learned
Counsel that the use of ‘electric power’ is essential for the purpose of manufac-
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