Page 190 - ELT_1st September 2020_Vol 373_Part 5

628 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 373

15. The order of the CESTAT, Kolkata dated 31-8-2016 has been
assailed by the appellant in the present appeal under Section 35G of the Central
Excise Act, 1944.
16. Mr. D. Saikia, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has urged
upon the ground that the notification of 8-7-1999 having provided for an exemp-
tion from excise duty for a period of ten years, the appellants are accordingly
entitled for the same and by the various orders of the authorities including the
order of Commissioner (Appeals) and the CESTAT, Kolkata such entitlement of
exemption for ten years cannot be reduced.
17. It is taken note of that the CESTAT, Kolkata in its order dated
31-8-2016 had arrived at a categorical conclusion that as per clause 4 of the notifi-
cation dated 8-7-1999, the period of ten years has to be calculated from the date
of the said notification and that there is no provision that the period of ten years
has to commence from the date of any other subsequent notification.
18. When the provisions of clause 4 of the notification of 8-7-1999 is ex-
amined, it is seen that the said clause specifically provides that the period of ten
years would commence from the date of publication of the said notification i.e.
8-7-1999. Further, by the notification of 12-2-2002 an amendment was brought in
to the notification of 8-7-1999 whereby the provisions of the said notification
were made applicable to some more locations. Apart from bringing in some more
locations no further amendment was made to the notification of 8-7-1999. As a
consequence the provision of clause 4 of the notification of 8-7-1999, even after
the amendment of 12-2-2002, remains as it is. In other words, even after the
amendment was brought in by the notification of 12-2-2002, the provision of
clause 4 of the notification of 8-7-1999 also remains as it is and accordingly the
benefit of exemption shall be applicable to the industrial units located in the
newly added locations also from 8-7-1999. It is to be noted that the amendment
notification of 12-2-2002, in contradistinction, does not provide that the provi-
sions of the notification dated 8-7-1999 are also applicable to the additional loca-
tions.
19. We are also in agreement with the conclusion of the CESTAT, Kol-
kata that the eligibility order dated 31-1-2003 providing that the exemption for
ten years w.e.f. 12-2-2002 is erroneous.
20. In the resultant conclusion, we are of the view that under the notifi-
cation of 8-7-1999, as made applicable to the appellant by the notification of 12-2-
2002 upon their location being included, the appellant would be entitled to ex-
emption for a period of ten years from 8-7-1999.
21. In this respect reference is made to the decision of the Supreme
Court rendered in Union of India v. Wood Papers Ltd. {Manu/SC/0454/1991 :
(1990) 4 SCC 256 = 1990 (47) E.L.T. 500 (S.C.)], wherein, it has been held as
under :-
“Literally exemption is freedom from liability, tax or duty. Fiscally it
may assume varying shapes, specially, in a growing economy. For instance
tax holiday to new units, concessional rate of tax to goods or persons for
limited period or with the specific objection etc. That is why its construc-
tion, unlike charging provision, has to be tested on different touchstone. In
fact an exemption provision is like an exception and on normal principle of
construction or interpretation of statutes it is construed strictly either be-
cause of legislative intention or on economic justification of inequitable

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