Page 192 - ELT_1st September 2020_Vol 373_Part 5

630 EXCISE LAW TIMES [ Vol. 373

Excise, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 488 = 1996 (86) E.L.T. 177 (S.C.), it has been held
as under :
“7.....The Exemption Notification must be so construed as to give due
weight to the liberal language it uses…..”
25. From the aforesaid provisions of law, the following propositions,
amongst others can be culled out :
(i) If there is a question as to whether a beneficiary comes within the
purview of an exemption notification, then it being in the nature of
an exception has to be strictly construed, but once, it is established
that the beneficiary is entitled to the benefit of exemption, then the
provisions of the exemption notification has to be given a wider and
liberal construction.
(ii) When the exemptions are granted with the object to encourage in-
dustrial growth, or to encourage exports, the exemptions provided
in the exemption notification be given its full effect and such enti-
tlements should not be constricted by attempting a narrower con-
struction.
26. In view of the aforesaid propositions of law, the notifications dated
8-7-1999 and 12-2-2002 have to be interpreted in a manner that once a particular
industrial unit is brought within the purview of the notification of 8-7-1999 by
including through an amendment made by the notification of 12-2-2002, the ex-
emption benefit provided by the notification of 8-7-1999 would be squarely ap-
plicable in respect of such industrial unit. The notification of 8-7-1999 having
specifically provided that the exemptions would be available for a period of 10
years w.e.f. the date of the said notification, i.e., 8-7-1999, any industrial unit sub-
sequently brought within the purview of the notification by virtue of any later
amendment, would also be entitled to the benefit of exemption from 8-7-1999.
27. In the aforesaid context the contention sought to be raised by the re-
spondent authorities that the appellant would be entitled to the benefit of exemp-
tion from the date of the notification of 12-2-2002, inasmuch as, only after the
said notification the appellant is entitled for an exemption and that such exemp-
tion would come to an end on the expiry of 10 (ten) years from the notification of
8-7-1999, would be unacceptable. The said contention would not only be contrary
to the provisions of the notifications dated 8-7-1999 and 12-2-2002, but also
would amount to giving a constricted interpretation to the provisions of the noti-
fications, which would be impermissible in view of the aforesaid provisions of
law.
28. In view of the above, the appellant would be entitled to the benefit
of exemption from excise duties for a period of 10 (ten) years w.e.f. 8-7-1999 and
the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise at Guwahati dated 24-1-
2011, the Commissioner (Appeals) dated 27-8-2013 and the CESTAT dated 31-8-
2016 in Appeal No. 75248/2014 are, accordingly, set aside.
29. The respondent authorities would be required to do the needful to
ensure that the appellant is given the benefit of exemption from the excise duty
as indicated above, if necessary by adopting the procedure of refund, in the
event, the duties have already been paid by the appellant.
30. The appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated above.
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