Page 50 - GSTL_7th May 2020_Vol 36_Part 1

8 GST LAW TIMES [ Vol. 36
13. In the early decision of this Court in Chimanlal Jagjivandas Sheth v.
State of Maharashtra [AIR 1963 SC 665], the question before a four judge Bench
was whether absorbent cotton wool, roller bandages, and gauzes would fall
within the ambit of Section 3(b) of the Act of 1940. The Court held :
“3. The said definition of “drugs” is comprehensive enough to take in not
only medicines but also substances intended to be used for or in the treat-
ment of diseases of human beings or animals. This artificial definition in-
troduces a distinction between medicines and substances which are not
medicines strictly so-called. The expression “substances”, therefore, must be
something other than medicines but which are used for treatment. The part of the
definition which is material for the present case is “substances intended to
be used for or in the treatment”. The appropriate meaning of the expression
“substances” in the section is “things”‘. It cannot be disputed, and indeed it
is not disputed, that absorbent cotton wool, roller bandages and gauze are
“substances” within the meaning of the said expression. If so, the next ques-
tion is whether they are used for or in “treatment”.
…
It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to define exhaustively “the sub-
stances” falling within the definition of “drugs”; and we consider that whether or
not surgical instruments are “drugs”, the articles concerned in this case are.”
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court held that the comprehensive nature of the definition includes both
medicines and something other than medicines, but which are used for treat-
ment. In that case, the question concerned whether absorbent cotton wool, roller
bandages and gauze are ‘substances’ within the ambit of Section 3(b). It is in that
context that this Court held that substances are ‘things’. The Court clarified that
it was not necessary to exhaustively define ‘the substances’ which fall within the
ambit of drugs as defined in Section 3(b). A substance may be a product, which
though not specifically used as a medicine is used for diagnosis, treatment, miti-
gation or prevention of diseases [Barium, for example, is a substance used as an
element in the diagnostic process in X-rays.]. Where a product other than a medi-
cine is intended to be used for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or pre-
vention of any disease or disorder, the same would be a ‘substance’ falling with-
in the ambit of Section 3(b)(i).
14. The Learned Counsel for the appellants urged that the phrase “in-
tended to be used for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of
any disease or disorder” in Section 3(b)(i) is only applicable to ‘substances’ and
not ‘medicines’. In Ishwar Singh Bindra v. The State of UP [(1969) 1 SCR 219], the
central question before a three judge Bench of this Court was the interpretation
of Section 3(b)(i) of the 1940 Act. This Court held :
“11. Now if the expression “substances” is to be taken to mean something
other than “medicine” as has been held in our previous decision it becomes
difficult to understand how the word “and” as used in the definition of
drug in Section 3(b)(i) between “medicines” and “substances” could have
been intended to have been used conjunctively. It would be much more ap-
propriate in the context to read it disjunctively. In Stroud’s Judicial Diction-
ary, 3rd Edn. it is stated at p. 135 that “and” has generally a cumulative
sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together,
and herein it is the antithesis of or. Sometimes, however, even in such a
connection, it is, by force of a contexts, read as “or”. Similarly, in Maxwell
on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., it has been accepted that “to carry

GST LAW TIMES  7th May 2020  50