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2020 ] STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. LINDE INDIA LTD. 9
out the intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read
the conjunctions ‘or’ and ‘and’ one for the other”.
This Court held that as the word ‘substances’ in the clause is used to mean some-
thing other than ‘medicine’, it was not the intention of the legislature that the
word “and” was meant to be read conjunctively. Accordingly, this Court held
that the two parts of the definitional clause must be read disjunctively.
15. In the above view, Section 3(b)(i) stipulates that medicines or sub-
stances used for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of any
disease or disorder in human beings, or animals shall be included within the am-
bit of the definition. It is significant to note the use of the phrase ‘for or in’ in the
definitional clause. Section 3(b)(i) includes both medicines or substances used for
the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of any disease or disorder or in
the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of any disease or disorder.
Where the former highlights the direct use of the product in question in diagnos-
ing, treating, mitigating or preventing a disease or disorder, the latter highlights
its instrumental use as a facilitative agent in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation
or prevention of any disease or disorder. The relevant enquiry for this Court is
whether Medical Oxygen IP and Nitrous Oxide IP are used in or for any of the
purposes specified therein.
16. The term ‘medicine’ is not defined in the 1940 Act. It is a trite prin-
ciple of interpretation that the words of a statute must be construed according to
the plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. Justice G.P. Singh in his
seminal work Principles of Statutory Interpretation states :
“The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or
popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their
grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is
something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest the contra-
ry...in the statement of the rule, the epithets ‘natural’, ‘ordinary’, ‘literal’,
grammatical’ and ‘popular’ are employed almost interchangeably.
…
It is often said that a word, apart from having a natural, ordinary or popu-
lar meaning (including other synonyms i.e. literal, grammatical and prima-
ry), may have a secondary meaning which is less common e.g. technical or
scientific meaning. But once it is accepted that natural, ordinary or popular
meaning of the word is derived from its context, the distinction drawn be-
tween different meanings loses much of its relevance.”
Similarly, Craies on Statute Law states :
“One of the basic principles of interpretation of Statutes is to construe them
according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is
contrary to, or inconsistent with, any express intention or declared purpose
of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or incon-
sistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or
abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus
of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the
party who alleges it. He must advance something which clearly shows that
the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the
Act or lead to some manifest absurdity.”
The words of a statute should be first understood in their natural, ordinary or
popular sense and phrases and sentences should be construed according to their
grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is
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