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rector General, Foreign Trade, impugn the aforesaid judgments, dated 27th Janu-
ary, 2015 supra (insofar as it allowed WP (C) 1663/2012) as well as the judgment
dated 14th January, 2019 passed in WP (C) 6640/2015.
21. Mr. Arun Bhardwaj, Learned Central Government Standing Coun-
sel for the appellants, laid repeated emphasis on the decisions of the PIC, taking
in its meeting dated 27th December, 2011. He submitted that a conscious decision
had been taken by the PIC - which was empowered to interpret the provisions of
the FTP - that, in view of the avowed objectives of the SFIS, the benefit thereof
could not be made available to Indian subsidiaries of foreign companies and to
entities which did not create a powerful and unique “served from India” brand.
22. These being the two considerations on which Respondent No. 1 had
been denied the benefits of the SFIS, Mr. Arun Bhardwaj would seek to contend
that the Learned Single Judge was in error in reversing the said decision.
23. Mr. Arun Bhardwaj also places reliance on para 2.3 of the FTP
whereunder the interpretation, by the DGFT, of the provisions in the FTP, was
final and binding.
24. We are unable to subscribe to the view canvassed by the appellant.
25. Para 3.6.4.2 of the FTP 2004-2009 is clear and unequivocal in its
terms. All Service Providers, who provided service enlisted in Appendix 10 of the FTP,
and who have a total free foreign exchange earning of at least ` 10 Lakhs in the preceding
financial year, qualified for the benefits of the SFIS. Significantly, the clause talks that
all such service providers, shall qualify for the benefits of the SFIS Scheme.
26. Etymologically, the expression “shall” denotes a mandate, and the Su-
preme Court has, in various decisions, held so [Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan,
AIR 1967 SCC 1074; Janki Sugar Mills v. Commissioner of Meerut Divn., (1979) 1
SCC 524; Divisional Level Committee v. Sahu Stone Crushing Industries, (1998) 8 SCC
435; Biswanath Poddar v. Archana Poddar, (2001) 8 SCC 187; Hemalata Gargya v.
C.I.T., (2003) 9 SCC 510]. Equally numerous, however, are decisions which hold
that the expression “shall” is not, inevitably, to be regarded as mandatory, and
the court is required to be guided by the real intention of the Legislature, as it
appears by attending to the whole scope of the statute [State of U.P. v. Babu Ram,
AIR 1961 SCC 751]. It is also well-settled that beneficial fiscal statute sought to be
liberally construed, and provisions which confer tax benefits, conditional to obli-
gations to be fulfilled by the beneficiary, should be so construed as to advance
the benefit, rather than deny the same, subject, of course, to fulfilment of the req-
uisite obligation. In C.I.T. v. Straw Board Manufacturing Co. [AIR 1989 SC 1490], it
was held that a provision, granting concessions from payment of tax, for the pur-
pose of encouraging an industrial activity, was required to be liberally construed. Specifi-
cally in the context of an exemption notification, issued with the object of encouraging
exports by granting exemption from customs duty on materials required for the manufac-
ture of the resultant product - a situation which can easily be analogised to the case before
us - the Supreme Court held that a liberal interpretation, so as to extend the bene-
fit of exemption, was required to be adopted, and the words “material required
to be imported for the purpose of manufacture of products” ought to be con-
strued as including not only materials actually used in the manufacture of the
resultant product, but also materials which, though they are not actually so used,
are required in order to manufacture the resultant product [Oblum Electrical In-
dustries Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, 1997 (94) E.L.T. 449 (S.C.)]. In Hemraj
Gordhandas v. H.H. Dave [1978 (2) E.L.T. J350 (S.C.); AIR 1970 SCC 755], a Consti-
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