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2020 ] UNION OF INDIA v. E.I. DUPOINT INDIA 631
tution Bench of the Supreme Court held that, if a taxpayer fell within the plain
terms of an exemption notification, the benefit of the notification could not be
denied by calling, in aid, any supposed intention, and the language of the notifi-
cation had to be given effect to.
27. Nearly a century ago, it was classically enunciated, thus, in Cape
Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [(1921) 1 KB 64], thus :
“...in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no
room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. Nothing is to be read
in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The above aphorism, as enunciated by Rowlatt, J., is generally regarded as locus
classicus.
28. It cannot be forgotten that export promotions schemes are intended to ben-
efit exporters, who, through the export, earn valuable foreign exchange. It is precisely for
this reason that, minimum free foreign exchange has been stipulated as one of the pre-
conditions for being entitled to the benefits of SFIS. It would do complete disservice
to the intent to clause 3.6.4.2 of the SFIS, therefore, to restrict the benefit thereof, to
entities which fulfil the two conditions stipulated therein, viz. of providing of a
service/services listed in Appendix-10 of the FTP and of earning free foreign ex-
change of at least ` 10 lakhs in the preceding financial year, to the benefits of the
said Scheme.
29. The decision of the said PIC is, therefore, on the fact of it, unsus-
tainable in law.
30. The PIC, no doubt, was entitled to interpret the policy. Under the
guise of such interpretation, however, the PIC had no authority, however, to reword
the policy, or import, into the policy, conditions and restrictions which were not to be
found therein. What the PIC has effectively done is to dovetail para 3.6.4.1 of the FTP
2004-2009 into para 3.6.4.2 thereof. Such an exercise is totally untenable in law. If
the framers of the FTP intended to subject the entitlement, or the eligibility, to
benefits under the SFIS, by the objective thereof, the framers ought to have ex-
pressly done so. This, having not been done by the framers of the policy, cannot
be done by its interpreter. The interpreter of the law cannot be wiser than the
framer thereof.
31. A juxtaposed comparison of para 3.6.4.2 of the FTP 2004-2009, with
para 3.12.2 of the FTP 2009-2014, underscores this legal position. The framers of
the policy had, while framing the FTP 2009-2014, consciously limited the benefits,
to the SFIS, available thereunder, to Indian service providers. The respondent,
very fairly, does not seek to avail the benefit of FTP 2009-2014.
32. The claim of the appellant, if accepted, would result to substituting
para 3.6.4.2, in the FTP 2004-2009, with para 3.12.2 of the FTP 2009-2014. Need-
less to say, this can never be allowed.
33. We, therefore, find no infirmity with the judgment, dated 27th January,
2015 and judgment dated 14th January, 2019, of the Learned Single Judge in WP (C)
No. 1663/2012 and WP (C) No. 6640/2015, respectively. Respondent No. 1, clearly, was
entitled to the benefits of the SFIS, under the FTP 2004-2009.
34. The reliance, by the appellant, on the LPA, preferred against the
judgment dated 27th January, 2015, insofar as it allowed WP (C) 7011/2012 filed
by M/s. Yum Restaurants (I) Pvt. Ltd. (supra), is, obviously, totally misplaced, as
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